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ABSTRACT
This dissertation presents a new approach to static analysis for security vetting of Android
apps, and a general framework called Argus-SAF. Argus-SAF determines points-to information for
all objects in an Android app component in a flow and context-sensitive (user-configurable) way and
performs data-flow and data dependence analysis for the component. Argus-SAF also tracks inter-
component communication activities. It can stitch the component-level information into the app-
level information to perform intra-app or inter-app analysis. Moreover, Argus-SAF is NDK/JNI-
aware and can efficiently track precise data-flow across language boundary. This dissertation shows
that, (a) the aforementioned type of comprehensive app analysis is utterly feasible in terms of
computing resources with modern hardware, (b) one can easily leverage the results from this general
analysis to build various types of specialized security analyses – in many cases the amount of
additional coding needed is around 100 lines of code, and (c) the result of those specialized analyses
leveraging Argus-SAF is at least on par and often exceeds prior works designed for the specific
problems, which this dissertation demonstrate by comparing Argus-SAF’s results with those of
prior works whenever the tool can be obtained. Since Argus-SAF’s analysis directly handles inter-
component and inter-language control and data flows, it can be used to address security problems
that result from interactions among multiple components from either the same or different apps and
among java code and native code.Argus-SAF’s analysis is sound in that it can assure the absence
of the specified security problems in an app with well-specified and reasonable assumptions on
Android runtime system and its library.
vii
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
1.1 Android Security Issues and Vetting System
The Android smart-phone platform is immensely popular and has by far the most siganificant
market share among all types of smartphones worldwide. However, there have been widely reported
security problems due to malicious or vulnerable applications running on Android devices.
Fuchs et al. [1], Gibler et al. [2] described the sensitive data leakage issue frequently occurred
for Android applications.
Lu et al. [3], Wang et al. [4] discovered a paticular type of data injection problem in Android
domain, called intent injection vulnerability. This type of vulnerability allows the attacker to abuse
capability provided by Android component and escalate their privilege.
Poeplau et al. [5] systematically studied the dynamic code loading functionality in an Android
application. They revealed this capability often time being abused by benign apps, as well as
leveraged by malware to execute the malicious payload stealthily.
Felt et al. [6], Zhou et al. [7, 8], Wei et al. [9] profiled the malicious behavior and technology
evolution for Android malware over the past years. Based on their description, the majority of An-
droid malware targeted on malicious behaviors, such as, stealing device user’s sensitive information,
damaging the device, or annoying the user.
Recent studies [8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15] have shown that native code is a continuous threat
which might stealthily leak sensitive information or utilize Android malware to evade AV detection.
The current solutions to those security problems are mostly reactive (e.g., pulling an app off
the market after potential damage may have already been done). There have not been effective
vetting methods that market operators can rely upon to ensure apps entering a market (e.g.,Google
Play) are free of certain types of security problems. Often, they have to resort to dynamic analysis
1
— running an app in a testing environment with the hope of identifying the problematic behaviors,
if any, during the test run (e.g.,Google Bouncer [16]).
Many security problems of Android apps can be discovered by static analysis on the Dalvik
bytecode of the apps, and there have been a number of earlier efforts along this line [3, 8, 10, 13,
17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27]. Compared with dynamic analysis, static analysis has the
advantage that a malicious app cannot easily evade detection by changing their behaviors in a
testing environment, and it can also provide a comprehensive picture of an app’s possible behaviors
as opposed to only those that manifest during the test run. Due to the inherent undecidability
nature of determining code behaviors, any static analysis method must make a trade-off between
computing time and the precision of analysis results. Precision can be characterized as metrics on:
1) missed behaviors (app behaviors missed by the analyzer that may present security risks, also
referred to as false negatives), and
2) false alarms (behaviors that an app does not possess, but the analyzer fails to rule out, also
referred to as false positives).
1.2 Previous Works on Android Security Analysis
1.2.1 Android Static Analysis
There has been a long line of works on applying static analysis for Android security prob-
lems [3, 17,18,19,25,26,28,29,30,31,32,33,34]. Most closely related works are described below.
The design of Argus-SAF leverages a number of approaches from FlowDroid [19, 30] (e.g.,
callback collection algorithm during environment generation), but the two also have significant
differences. FlowDroid does not handle ICC and as such cannot address security issues involving
intent passing among multiple components. FlowDroid builds a call graph based on Spark/Soot [35],
which conducts a flow-insensitive points-to analysis. FlowDroid then conducts a taint and on-
demand alias analysis based on the above call graph, using IFDS [36,37] which is flow and context-
sensitive. The flow-insensitivity in the call graph construction may introduce spurious call edges
(false positives), which could impact the analysis precision of the subsequent IFDS analysis. Argus-
SAF computes the call graph at the same time as the data-flow analysis by computing the flow and
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context-sensitive points-to facts; thus its call graph is more precise, which could lead to fewer false
positives in the final analysis results. FlowDroid does not calculate alias or points-to information
for all objects in both flow and context-sensitive way. This is a design decision from computing
cost concerns [30]. Argus-SAF calculates all objects’ points-to information in both context and
flow-sensitive way, with reasonable computing cost (ref. Section 7.1). This capability enables us
to build the generic framework supporting multiple security analyses. Moreover, FlowDroid avoids
to handle native method invocation and applies a comprehensive model for native method calls.
Argus-SAF provides a comprehensive analysis scheme for inter-language data-flow analysis.
Epicc [18] computes Android Intent call parameters using the same IDE framework as Flow-
Droid, by modeling the intent data structure explicitly in the flow functions. To the best of our
knowledge, Epicc does not use the Intent parameter analysis result to resolve the Intent call targets
in the general case and has not used the result to perform the inter-component data-flow analysis.
Argus-SAF’s approach to deriving Intent parameters is to simply use the flow and context-sensitive
points-to information (including that for string objects) already computed in the DFG, without the
need for a separate data-flow analysis just for Intent. Argus-SAF also uses the Intent call parameter
information to link Intent call sites to call targets, resulting in a DFG that includes data flow paths
both within and across components. Moreover, recent work [38] shows that domain knowledge
and probabilistic models can be leveraged in Intent destination resolution, which Argus-SAF could
adopt. Moreover, Epicc cannot resolve Intent call parameters if it presents in the native code.
Argus-SAF has the solution to capture intent calls in native code.
Recently, IccTA [26] and DroidSafe [25] made advancement in the state-of-the-art of Android
app static analysis. IccTA extends FlowDroid and uses IC3 [33] as the Intent resolution engine,
which can now track data flows through regular Intent calls and returns. However, IccTA is yet to
track the information flow through remote procedure call (RPC). DroidSafe [25] tracks both Intent
and RPC calls but does not capture data flows through “stateful ICC” nor inter-app analysis. None
of IccTA and DroidSafe handles native method call.
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Recent works [32,34] explored various approaches to tracking Android inter-app communi-
cation for security vetting. The new component-based analysis of Argus-SAF as discussed in this
paper supports inter-app analysis naturally (see Section 4.6).
Lu et al. [3] use a static-analysis scheme called CHEX to detect component hijacking problem
in Android, which is reduced to finding information flows. CHEX first constructs app-splits, each
of which is a code segment reachable from an entry point. It then computes the data-flow summary
for each split using Wala [39]. The split summaries are linked in all permutations that do not
violate the Android system call sequences and could result in transitive information flow. Argus-
SAF computes information flow differently – through the usage of an environment method for each
component that calls the relevant callbacks in the right order (per Android system specification),
and by building the DFG and DDG for the complete app. CHEX does not have the provision to
track data flow through the ICC channels, which Argus-SAF does.
Chin et al. [17] first systematically studied the attack surface related to Intent. In particular,
they identified problems such as unauthorized intent receipt and intent spoofing. They also devel-
oped a static analysis tool which can raise warnings for the above problems in an over-conservative
manner. Their tool ComDroid performs flow-sensitive, intra-procedural static analysis, and the
paper states that there is a limited inter-procedural analysis that “follows method invocations to a
depth of one method call.” Argus-SAF performs a full-fledged inter-procedural data-flow analysis
in a flow and context-sensitive way, and also tracks the data flows over the ICC channels. While
the author would like to conduct comparison study between ComDroid and Argus-SAF, the link
to the ComDroid tool (used to be http://www.comdroid.org) is no longer there.
Most of the existing works that leverage static analysis are focused on finding specific Android
security problems, and the static analyses used do not seem to address some critical issues such as
the inter-component and inter-language nature of Android app’s execution and the precise modeling
of Android’s callback sequences. In contrast, Argus-SAF is a precise, general and efficient inter-
component NDK/JNI-aware static analysis framework which can address a broad range of security
issues in Android apps.
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1.2.2 Dynamic and Hybrid Analysis
TaintDroid [21] is a dynamic (runtime) taint-tracking and analysis system to find potential
misuse of the user’s private information.
DroidScope [10] is an Android application dynamic analysis tool that reconstructs OS level
and DVM level information. DroidScope collects detailed native and Dalvik instruction traces, pro-
file API-level activity, and track information leakage through both the Java and native components
using dynamic taint analysis.
NDroid [11] performs dynamic taint analysis based on QEMU and tracks information flows
through JNI . NDroid instruments important related JNI functions to resolve information flows,
such as JNI entry, JNI exit, object creation. Moreover, It models the system library instead
of instrumenting those standard functions to reduce overhead. However, similar to all dynamic
analysis systems, NDroid has the path coverage issue, and it does not track control flows.
TaintART [40] applies dynamic taint tracking by instrumentation the ART compiler and
runtime. TaintART follows NDroid ’s method to handle JNI calls.
Harvester [27] employs hybrid analysis for extracting runtime values. When encountered
with native methods, Harvester monitors them as logging points to extract runtime values instead
of stepping into the native code to conduct the analysis.
Going Native [14] conducts static analysis to filter apps containing native code firstly and
then perform dynamic analysis to study the native code usage of real-world Android apps. Then
it generates native code sandboxing security policy.
Malton [15] is a dynamic analysis platform aimed to do malware detection that runs on
ART runtime. Malton conducts multi-layer monitoring including native layer and information flow
tracking to provide a comprehensive view of the Android malware behaviors.
DroidNative [41] utilizes specific control flow patterns to reduce the impact of obfuscations
and use it as semantic-based signatures to detect malware in ART runtime.
All dynamic analyses are subject to evasion attacks. For example, researchers have shown [42]
that Google’s Bouncer [16] can be fingerprinted and hence evaded by a well-crafted app. On the
other hand, static analysis investigates the code of the app (such as, along with the app’s manifest),
5
which determines the runtime behaviors of the app; this makes it attractive for security vetting.
Recently Sounthiraraj et al. [22] showed that static and dynamic analysis could be combined to
achieve more effective detection/confirmation of security problems. Our approach provides a precise
and general static analysis framework that can complement dynamic analyses.
1.3 Android Static Analysis Challenges
A practical challenge in static analysis is to control the rate of false alarms while not missing
any (potentially dangerous) behaviors of apps. This is especially significant due to a number of
features of Android.
1) Android is an event-based system. The control flow is driven by events from an app’s envi-
ronment that can trigger various method calls. How to capture all the possible control flow
paths in this open and reactive system while not introducing too many spurious paths (false
alarms) is a significant challenge. (Solution at Chapter 2.)
2) The Android runtime consists of a large base of library code that an app depends upon. The
event-driven nature makes a large portion of the control-flow involve the Android library.
While fully analyzing the whole library code could improve the analysis’ faithfulness, it may
also be prohibitively expensive (or imprecise). (Solution at Chapter 2.)
3) Android is a component-based system and makes extensive use of inter-component commu-
nication (ICC). For example, a component can send an Intent to another component. The
target of an Intent could be specified explicitly in the Intent or be implicit and decided at
runtime. Both control and data can flow through the ICC mechanism from one component to
another. Capturing all ICC flows accurately is a major challenge in static analysis. (Solution
at Chapter 4.)
4) Android provides a Native Development Kit (NDK) [43] which allows the developer to design
app in native language (C/C++). NDK enables native Activity component, provides a set of
native libraries to assist native code to access Android-specific features and uses Java Native
Interface (JNI) as the communication bridge. Precisely tracking data flows in native Activity
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component and modeling NDK libraries and JNI data structures are significant challenges.
(Solution at Chapter 5.)
Prior research has attempted to address some of the above challenges. For example, Flow-
Droid [19, 30] formally models the event-driven lifecycle of an Android app in a “dummyMain”
method, but it does not address ICC. Epicc [18] statically analyzes Intent and uses an IDE [37]
framework to solve for Intent call parameters, but does not link the Intent call sources to targets
and does not perform data-flow analysis across component-boundaries. CHEX [3] uses a different
approach to the modeling of the Android environment, by linking pieces of code reachable from
entry points (called splits) as a way to discover data flows between the Android application compo-
nents, but it does not address data flow through Intent channels. IC3 [33] is a composite constant
propagation engine to solve Intent values in the whole application. IccTA [26] extends FlowDroid
and uses IC3 as the Intent resolution engine, which can track data flows through regular Intent calls
and returns. However, IccTA is yet to track a special category of ICC named remote procedure call
(RPC) that invokes a method in a bound service component. DroidSafe [25] attempts to track both
Intent and RPC calls. It performs an app-level analysis with flow-insensitive points-to information.
None of the works mentioned above can capture data flows through “stateful ICC,” where compo-
nent A sends data to B through one ICC, and later component A retrieves that same data from
B through another ICC. Moreover, none of the works mentioned above can capture inter-language
data-flow.
1.4 Contributions
I designed and built Argus-SAF– a precise, general and efficient data-flow analysis framework
tailored for Android apps. The executable and source of Argus-SAF are publicly available.1 The
main contributions from Argus-SAF are:
1) Argus-SAF computes points-to information for all objects and their fields at each program
point and calling context. The points-to information is extremely useful for analyzing a num-
ber of security problems that have been addressed in prior works using customized methods.
1Argus-SAF is available at http://pag.arguslab.org/argus-saf.
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Argus-SAF can be used to address these wide-range security problems directly with very little
additional work. This dissertation also shows that such comprehensive analysis scales to large
apps.
2) As part of the computation of object points-to information, Argus-SAF can build a highly
precise inter-procedural control flow graph (ICFG) of an app component , which is both flow
and context-sensitive [44]. This is a side benefit of our approach compared to prior works
that have adopted existing static analysis frameworks (e.g.,Soot [35] and Wala [39]), which
build ICFG with less precision [45,46].
3) Argus-SAF adopts a summary-based bottom-up data-flow analysis (SBDA) approach to
compute flow and context-sensitive inter-language data-flow information efficiently. The
summary-based nature of SBDA enables us to design unified heap manipulation summary
representation for both java world and native world data-flow analysis. The bottom-up ap-
proach allows us only to visit each method exactly once to compute summary ∆ and reuse ∆
when a caller method invokes it.
4) Argus-SAF comprehensively models control and data-flow behavior for the Native compo-
nent, NDK libraries, and JNI data structures to enable existing binary analysis tool, such as
Angr [47] to understand Android-specific data flows.
5) For each app component, Argus-SAF builds a Data-flow Graph (DFG), which consists of
the component’s ICFG together with each node’s (in ICFG) reaching (points-to) fact set.
Then, Argus-SAF builds the data dependence graph (DDG) for each app component from
its DFG . Furthermore, for each app component Argus-SAF builds a summary table (ST )
listing its inter-component communication (control and data flow) activities over multiple
channels, such as Intent, RPC, and static fields. Argus-SAF can conduct an elementary
string analysis (due to its object-sensitivity) for inferring Intent/RPC call parameters and
finds the correspondence between an ICC source and the ICC targets based on flow and
context-sensitive matching algorithm. Using STs of multiple components, Argus-SAF can
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stitch the component-level DDGs into an app-level inter-component DDG that supports both
intra-app and inter-app analysis.
6) An analyst can add a security checker on top of Argus-SAF to detect the specific security
problem he/she is interested. Through extensive experimentation, this dissertation demon-
strates that a variety of security problems can be reduced to querying DFGs and DDGs.
Argus-SAF is evaluated extensively on real-world apps. The experimental results show that
Argus-SAF scales well. I used Argus-SAF to address security problems such as data leakage (e.g.,
SMS message leakage), injection (e.g., intent injection), and misuse/abuse of APIs (e.g., to hide
app icon). The core framework of I evaluated takes several minutes to analyze one app on average.
All the specialized security checkers require minimal additional coding effort (around 100 LOC) to
leverage Argus-SAF’s DFGs and DDGs to address the specific problem, and the additional running
time is negligible (typically in the order of tens of milliseconds).
Then, an experiment is conducted to compare Argus-SAF with three state-of-the-art static
analyzers for Android apps: FlowDroid [19], IccTA [26] and DroidSafe [25], and show that Argus-
SAF can address a broader range of security problems due to inter-component communications.
Argus-SAF also found multiple crucial security problems in Android apps that were never reported
before in the literature.
Some materials presented in this dissertation were published in 21st ACM Conference on
Computer and Communications Security (CCS) in 2014 [48] and ACM Transactions on Privacy
and Security (TOPS) in 2018 [49].
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CHAPTER 2: ANDROID SYSTEM MODEL 1
2.1 Runtime Environment Model
2.1.1 Event-based System
An Android app is not a closed system; the Android system provides an environment in which
the app runs. The code that may execute during the lifetime of an app is not all present in the
app’s package. The Android system (which includes the Android runtime) does a bulk of the work
in addition to that by the app’s code.
Activity Lifecycle
onCreate()
onStart()
onResume()
Activity Running
onPause()
App Process Killed
onStop()
onDestroy()
Activity Launched
Activity shut down
onRestart()
User 
Interactions
System Event
……
Figure 2.1: Activity lifecycle
In Android, numerous types of events (such as system events, UI events) can trigger callback
methods defined in an app. As an example, while an Activity A is running, if another Activity B
comes to the foreground, it is considered an event. This event could trigger A.onPause(), which
1This chapter is partially based on the authors CCS 2014 [48] and TOPS 2018 [49] papers. See Appendix A for
permission.
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is either defined in the app’s code, or in the Android framework if the developer did not override
the default method. Figure 2.1 depicts the lifecycle of an Activity. There are seven lifecycle
methods of an Activity, such as onCreate(), onPause(), onResume(); they each represent a state
in the transition diagram of the lifecycle. Android documentation specifies other states such as
Activity running and Activity shut down. At Activity running state, the Activity is capable of
responding other types of events, such as button click, GPS location update. Similarly, other types
of components have a well-defined lifecycle involving multiple lifecycle methods and can handle
different kinds of events.
public class MainActivity extends Activity {
String str;
@Override
protected void onCreate(Bundle savedInstanceState) {
super.onCreate(savedInstanceState);
setContentView(R.layout.activity_main);
TelephonyManager tel = (TelephonyManager) getSystemService(TELEPHONY_SERVICE);
str = tel.getDeviceId(); // Source
}
@Override
protected void onStart() {
super.onStart();
Log.i("imei", str); // Sink
}
}
MainActivity.java
J1.
J2.
J3.
J4.
J5.
J6.
J7.
J8.
J9.
J10.
J11.
J12.
J13.
J14.
J15.
J16.
J17.
J18.
Figure 2.2: Lifecycle example
Take Figure 2.2 as an example. The MainActivity has field str. The onCreate() method
retrieves the device ID (sensitive information) and sets it to the str field, whereas the onStart()
method leak the str field into the log. If onCreate() and onStart() execute independently, this ex-
ample won’t have any information leakage problem. However, those two methods are running under
the same MainActivity’s context and executed following the system-defined order. Therefore, to
understand the data-flow between onCreate() and onStart() the static analyzer need to understand
and model how the system works.
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2.1.2 Component-level Environment Model
As demonstrates in Figure 2.2, a static analyzer needs to model the Android system to analyze
the system-defined control flows in the app2.
Argus-SAF introduces a component-level model that captures the system-defined flows. The
environment of a component C represents the main method, Env C, which takes as param-
eter an incoming intent i and invokes C’s lifecycle methods (e.g.,onCreate, onBind, or onRe-
ceive) based on C’s type (Activity, Service, Broadcast Receiver, etc.) and other callback methods
(e.g.,onLocationChanged) so that all possible paths are included. This component-level model is
useful in capturing the impact of the Android system on both the control sequence and data flow
of an app’s execution. Argus-SAF has a dedicated environment for each component that invokes
the set of callback methods implemented in the component; this is the control part of modeling
Android’s environment. Besides, the environment also keeps tracks of the intents received by the
component; this is the data part of modeling Android’s environment. Env C also passes the intent
parameter when necessary for other relevant methods (e.g.,onReceive() of a Broadcast Receiver).
Algorithm 1 Generating the environment method of component C
Input: The name of the component C, manifest file, resource files, IR of C.
Output: C’s environment method, Env C
1: procedure GenEnv(C)
2: create a method Env C having one parameter Intent i, and an empty body;
3: callBacks← collectCallbacks(C);
4: add callBacks into the body of Env C in the proper sequence emulating the reality;
5: return Env C;
6: end procedure
7: procedure collectCallbacks(C)
8: callBacks← empty Set;
9: while fixed-point is not reached do
10: perform reachability analysis to mark methods that are reachable from C
11: callBacks← callBacks ∪ callBacks from the XML-resource files
12: callBacks← callBacks ∪ interface-based callbacks as registered in C’s source code
13: callBacks← callBacks ∪ other callbacks (system methods that are overridden) in C’s source
14: end while
15: return callBacks;
16: end procedure
Argus-SAF generates the Environment Method (Env C) of each component C in the app
automatically. Algorithm 1 shows the pseudocode for generating Env C of a component C. As the
first step, an empty method with an Intent i as the parameter is generated. (Note that, Intent i
2The alternative is to fully analyze the whole Android system’s code, which is both expensive and unnecessary as
also observed by others [3, 25,26,30].
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typically represents the Intent which starts the component – for instance, e.g., the parameter of
Environment Method of BarActivity is the intent that starts BarActivity) Then, Argus-SAF collect
necessary information from the resource files in the apk and uses this information to collect layout
callback methods. Argus-SAF then generate the body of Env C with lifecycle methods based on
the type of C. Finally, Argus-SAF collect other callback methods (e.g.,onLocationChanged) in C
(through a reachability analysis) in an incremental fashion. All of these are done before performing
the data-flow analysis.
2.2 System API Model
Android has a large number of library APIs (that an app can call). Argus-SAF does not
analyze system library APIs; thus, it needs to provide models for those methods that summarize
how the data-flow facts may be changed. In general, Argus-SAF adopts the following strategy in
modeling Android system library APIs:
1) For library APIs that provide essential information for static analysis (e.g., intent manipula-
tion functions), a precise heap manipulation summary model is built for them based on the
function’s implementation and documentation.
2) For all other library APIs, a uniform conservative model is provided. The conservative model
essentially assumes that for every object parameter, any of its fields may be modified and be-
comes unknown; that is, the field can points-to a new object, or any existing object reachable
from the method parameters (and static fields) that is type compatible. If the method also
returns an object, the returned object is also considered unknown.
To construct a meaningful static analysis for Android application, Argus-SAF needs to pre-
cisely model thousands of system API methods. Therefore, an effective way is required, such as
design a domain specific language (DSL).
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2.2.1 Heap Manipulation Summary Language
The following language presents a summary ∆ for a method m:
〈∆〉 ::= ‘<’ 〈Rule〉* ‘>’
〈Rule〉 ::= ‘(’ [〈AssignRule〉 | 〈ActionRule〉] ‘)’
〈AssignRule〉 ::= 〈HeapLoc〉 [‘=’ | ‘+=’ | ‘-’] 〈RHS 〉
〈ActionRule〉 ::= 〈Action〉 ‘(’ 〈RHS 〉 ‘)’ ‘@’ 〈Loc〉
〈RHS 〉 ::= 〈HeapLoc〉 | 〈Instance〉
〈Action〉 ::= ‘˜’ | ‘source’ | ‘sink’
〈HeapLoc〉 ::= 〈HeapBase〉 〈Index 〉
〈HeapBase〉 ::= ‘arg’ Digits | ‘ret’ | ID
〈Index 〉 ::= ‘.’ ID | ‘[]’
〈Instance〉 ::= ID ‘@’ 〈Loc〉
〈Loc〉 ::= ID
∆ consists of a list of Rules. There are two types of Rule: AssignRule and ActionRule.
AssignRule defines what kind of data propagation happened for the given HeapLoc at which
Loc, whereas ActionRule defines what action should take for the HeapLoc. AssignRule allows
three operations: 1) ‘=’ strong update for a HeapLoc; 2) ‘+=’ weak update for a HeapLoc; 3) ‘-’
kill facts from RHS. ActionRule has three Actions: 1) ‘∼’ clear all heap for RHS; 2) ‘source’
mark an RHS as sensitive data; 3). ‘sink’ mark an RHS as a leaky point. RHS consists of
HeapLoc or Instance which represents right-hand-side values. HeapLoc is used to represent the
heap location which consists of HeapBase and Index. There are three types of HeapBase a callee
method could use to create heap manipulating side-effect: the heap of arguments, return value
and global variables. Depending on the object type of HeapBase, field access or array access
can be used to present the Index. Instance represents the object instance created at particular
Loc. For example, the setClass() system API call in Figure 2.3 has a summary ∆(setClass) =
〈(this.mClass = arg2)〉 where the this.mClass is a HeapLoc which means the mClass field of
“this” argument, and (this.mClass = arg2) indicates the mClass field of “this” argument will get
whatever value from the second argument.
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public class MainActivity extends Activity {
@Override
protected void onCreate(Bundle savedInstanceState) {
super.onCreate(savedInstanceState);
setContentView(R.layout.activity_main);
Intent i = new Intent();
i.setClass(getApplicationContext(), FooActivity.class); // ∆(setClass) = <(this.mClass = arg2)>
i.putExtra("key", "value"); // ∆(putExtra) = <(this.mExtras.key += arg1) (this.mExtras.value += arg2)>
startActivity(i);
}
}
MainActivity.java
J1.
J2.
J3.
J4.
J5.
J6.
J7.
J8.
J9.
J10.
J11.
Figure 2.3: Library API call example
Take Figure 2.3 as an example. J7 invokes setClass() to set FooActivity as the target com-
ponent for Intent i. The setClass() is an Android system API; thus the ∆(setClass) is applied.
∆(setClass) sets a class value obtained from the second argument to its containing Intent’s mClass
field. J8 inserts a key-value pair (“key,” “value”) into Intent i3’s mExtras3 field. The putExtra()
is an Android system API, and the ∆(putExtra) is applied. In this case, the summary tells the
static analysis engine to assign the key-value pair to the mExtras field of Intent i.
3The mExtras field is an aggregate object that may store multiple key-value pairs. Argus-SAF currently does not
model such aggregates and instead “flatten” all the elements in an aggregate into singleton instances. This will create
two possible interpretations of multiple facts regarding an aggregate object: either they are different possibilities
from different program branches, or they are part of a single aggregate in the same branch. Argus-SAF’s static
analyzer conservatively assumes both are possible to ensure soundness, but this could lose some precision. Modeling
aggregates is an engineering work that Argus-SAF will address in future work.
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CHAPTER 3: DATA-FLOW ANALYSIS 1
Determining object points-to information is a core underlying problem in almost all static
analyses for Android app security, such as finding information leaks, inferring Intent calls, identi-
fying misuse of specific library functions, and others. Instead of addressing each of these problems
using different specialized models and algorithms, it is advantageous to pre-calculate all object
points-to information at once and use this as a general framework for different types of further
analysis. This way the cost of computing points-to information is amortized across the large num-
ber of specialized analyses one will likely need to perform on a given app.
Existing off-the-shelf static analysis tools such as Soot [35] (used by FlowDroid [19, 30] and
Epicc [18]) and Wala [39] (used by CHEX [3]) have not provided capability of calculating all objects’
points-to information in both flow and context-sensitive way [45,46]. This is due to concerns about
computation cost. However, with the advancements in hardware (e.g., many-core machines), it
opens new possibilities to perform a more precise analysis.
Generally speaking, the core task of Argus-SAF’s analysis is aimed to build a precise inter-
procedural data-flow graph (DFG). The flow and context-sensitive data-flow analysis to calculate
object points-to information is done at the same time with building inter-procedural control flow
graph (ICFG). This is because, for one to precisely know the implementation method of a virtual
method invocation, one needs to know the receiver object’s dynamic type; conversely, flow-sensitive
data-flow analysis requires one to know how the program control flows. Thus, there is a mutual
dependency between the two analyses. Such integrated control and data-flow analyses approach
has been demonstrated to be both practical and effective for even analyzing temporal properties
of concurrent Java programs including the standard Java library codebase [50]. However, [50] does
not keep track of method calling context (typically termed monovariant calling context analysis
1This chapter is partially based on the authors CCS 2014 [48] and TOPS 2018 [49] papers. See Appendix A for
permission.
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or 0-calling context [44]). Argus-SAF generalizes the approach to precisely track the last k calling
contexts (polyvariant [44], a.k.a. k-limiting where k is user-configurable, and the additional calling
context beyond k is monovariant).
3.1 Reaching Facts Analysis (RFA)
Reaching Facts Analysis (RFA) computes points-to facts for each statement. Figure 3.1 illus-
trates a complete analysis from entry point (EP) method foo using RFA, and below the notations
and algorithm is introduced.
J1.
J2.
J3.
J4.
J5.
J6.
J7.
J8.
J9.
J10.
abstract class A0 {
String f;
abstract String bar(String s);
}
class A1 extends A0 {
@Override
String bar(String s) {
this.f = s;
return s;
}
}
class A2 extends A1 {
@Override
String bar(String s) {
return s;
}
}
void foo(B b) {
A0 a;
if(tossCoin) {
a = new A1();
} else {
a = new A2();
}
String str = "abc";
a.bar(str);
}
J11.
J12.
J13.
J14.
J15.
J16.
J17.
J18.
J19.
J20.
J21.
J22.
J23.
J24.
J25.
J26.
J27.
foo().Entry {<b, ☐J1>}
J3. if !tossCoin goto J6
J4. a = new A1() J6. a = new A2()
J8. String str = “abc”
J5. goto J8
J9. Call a.bar(str) 
J9. Return a.bar(str) 
foo().Exit
{<b, ☐J1>,
<a, J4>}
A1.bar(s).Entry
J18. this.f = s  
J29. return s  
A1.bar(s).Exit
A2.bar(s).Entry
J25. return s  
A2.bar(s).Exit
{<b, ☐J1>,
<a, J4>, <a, J6>}
{<a, J4>, 
<s, J8>}
{<b, ☐J1>,
<a, J4>,  <a, J6>,
<str, J8>}
(facts unrelated to
any callee)
map & 
filter facts 
for callee
{<b, ☐J1>}
{<b, ☐J1>} {<b, ☐J1>}
{<b, ☐J1>}
{<a, J4>, 
<s, J8>}
{<a, J4>, 
<s, J8>,
<J4.f, J8>}
{<a, J4>, 
<s, J8>,
<J4.f, J8>}
{<a, J6>, 
<s, J8>}
{<a, J6>, 
<s, J8>}
{<a, J6>, 
<s, J8>}
{<a, J4>, <a, J6>,
<str, J8>, <J4.f, J8>}
map & 
filter facts 
for caller
{b, ☐J1>, <a, J4>,
<a, J6>, <str, J8>, 
<J4.f, J8>}
Figure 3.1: Building the DFG for foo: The intra-procedural control flow graph (CFG) of foo is
extended to a callee, bar
3.1.1 Notations
There are two sets of facts associated with each statement: the set of facts entering into a
statement s is called the entry set of s (or just entry(s)); the set of facts exiting a statement s
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is called the exit set of s (or just exit(s)). Statement s may change entry(s) by killing stale facts
(kill(s)) and/or generating new facts (gen(s)). The gen and kill sets can be calculated using flow
functions that are based on s’ semantics. In general, the flow equations have the following forms.
exit(s) = (entry(s) \ kill(s)) ∪ gen(s) (3.1)
RFA keeps track of points-to facts, which provide information about what objects a variable
(register in Dalvik), an object field, or an array element may point to at a particular program point.
A points-to fact has the general form of 〈lhs, rhs〉.
The rhs may refer to either an object or an aggregate (usually key-value pairs). Objects
are dynamically allocated in the Dalvik VM heap space at object creation sites (through a “new”
statement). In our IR, each statement in the program is assigned a unique location N. Argus-
SAF uses this to represent the new object created at the location, and refer to it as instance N.
For example, (in Figure 3.1) location J4 generates the points-to fact 〈a, J4〉. Here J4 represents
instance J4, the object created at location J6. From the object creation site, Argus-SAF can
directly find the precise runtime type of the instance.
Let us use N to indicate any possible value that is type compatible with the received objects
at location N. For instance, Argus-SAF does not know the possible values that will be received for
an EP . As an example, location J1 generates a points-to fact 〈b, J1〉, indicating that the object
variable b points to an object that is passed to EP at location J1.
There are two types of lhs of a points-to fact, yielding two types of facts. A variable-fact is
when the lhs is a variable. A heap-fact is when the lhs is an object field or an array element. For
example, location J18 generates a heap-fact 〈(J4, f), (J8)〉, meaning that the field f of instance
J4 points to the string “abc” created at J8.
3.1.2 The Basic DFG Building Process
A static analyzer simulates the program and keeps track of the fact sets until a fixed point is
reached. The convergence to a fixed point (analysis termination) is guaranteed as long as the flow
equations are monotone, and the number of facts is finite, which hold for Argus-SAF’s analysis.
For a given app, it contains a finite number of object creation sites and variables/fields (and as
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typically done, elements of an array are summarized as one); moreover, Argus-SAF keeps track of
calling contexts up to a finite number k.
Argus-SAF builds the DFG by flowing the points-to facts from the program’s entry points.
Here the program is the IR of the app’s dex code augmented with the environment methods as
discussed in Section 2.1. Unlike Java applications, there is no “main” method in an Android app;
every component could be the starting point of an app. Our component-based environment model
captures the full life cycle of a component and all of its possible execution paths, including those
due to interacting with other components. Thus, if we assume one particular execution path starts
from component C, we can use C’s environment method E C as the program’s entry point. To
include all possible execution paths from all possible components, Argus-SAF does this for every
component in the app, yielding multiple DFGs. Formally, let C be a component, the DFG from C
is denoted DFG(E C) where E C is the environment method of C and is a tuple defined as the
following.
DFG(E C) ≡ ((N,E), {entry(n)| n ∈ N}) , (3.2)
where N and E are the nodes and edges of the inter-procedural control flow graph starting from
E C (denoted ICFG(E C)). entry(n) is the entry set of the statement associated with node n.
Each DFG(E C) captures the execution that starts from component C and may involve other
components due to ICC. Each statement node is annotated with the statement entry set (the exit
set is not shown for presentation sake). In this example, Argus-SAF starts building the DFG
from the entry point method foo with an empty fact set. Argus-SAF then simulates the program
statically based on each statement’s semantics and transforms the fact sets along the way based on
the flow equation (3.1).
As Figure 3.1 illustrated, at a control-flow join point, the exit fact sets from all incoming
edges are unioned (e.g., at J8); facts such as 〈a, J4〉 and 〈a, J6〉 coming from the different branches
accumulate in entry(J8). Similarly, one can compute entry(J9). At this point, Argus-SAF needs
to resolve the target for J9’s virtual method invocation with static type A0. The first argument of
the call instruction, a, is the receiver object. Since we now have calculated the possible points-to
values of a — instance J4 or instance J6, Argus-SAF can resolve the possible call targets precisely:
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Algorithm 2 Building Data-flow Graph (DFG)
Require: The entry point procedure, EP .
Ensure: DFG(EP)
1: procedure BuildDfg(EP)
2: icfg ≡ (N,E)← empty graph;
3: addCFG(icfg,CFG(EP));
4: ι← initial fact set;
5: entry ← emptyMap;
6: worklist ← emptyList ;
7: entry (EntryNode EP)← ι;
8: worklist ← worklist :: EntryNode EP;
9: while worklist 6= empty do
10: n← get (and deque) head from worklist ;
11: nodes ← processNode(icfg, n);
12: worklist ← worklist ::: nodes;
13: end while
14: return (icfg, entry);
15: end procedure
A1.bar for instance J4 and A2.bar for instance J6 (because both A1 and A2 override A0.bar). This
shows the advantage of doing a precise points-to analysis concurrently with ICFG building — not
only can Argus-SAF has more precise information on the call targets, but also it allows Argus-SAF
to flow more accurate facts to the different call targets. All of these increase the precision and can
potentially reduce the number of false alarms in the analysis results.
As shown in Figure 3.1, a call statement contributes a pair of CallNode and ReturnNode to
the ICFG . The CallNode connects to the callee’s EntryNode while the callee’s ExitNode connects
to the ReturnNode. In transferring facts between the caller and the callee, the variable-facts need
to be remapped to the formal parameters of the callee (e.g.,str in the caller maps to s in the callee).
This should be restored when the control returns to the caller. Only heap-facts reachable from the
call parameters are passed to the callee. The unreachable heap-facts, as well as unrelated variable-
facts, are transferred to the ReturnNode directly to improve efficiency. In the example of J9’s
method invocation, there is one variable-fact 〈b, J1〉 which is unrelated to both arguments a and
str. The flow of such fact (which is unrelated to any callee) is represented as a double-head arrow
from the CallNode to the ReturnNode. Similarly, there can be some facts at the callee side that are
unrelated to the caller (e.g., callee’s local variables and temporary objects), and Argus-SAF filters
them out at the callee’s ExitNode to improve efficiency.
Consider the data-flow analysis for A1.bar or A2.bar, which is a callee for J9’s method
invocation. Argus-SAF tracks the entry of each statement of A1.bar (or A2.bar). The author
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Algorithm 3 processNode: Pushing facts to successors
Require: ICFG, icfg ≡ (N,E) and a node, n ∈ N
Ensure: n’s successor nodes whose entry are updated.
1: procedure processNode(icfg, n)
2: tempList ← empty;
3: if n is an EntryNode or a ReturnNode then
4: for all p ∈ successors(n) do
5: entry(p)← entry(p) ∪ entry(n);
6: tempList ← tempList :: p;
7: end for
8: else if n is an ExitNode then
9: for all p ∈ successors(n) do
10: passRequiredFactsToCaller(n, p);
11: if p gets any new fact then
12: tempList ← tempList :: p;
13: end if
14: end for
15: else if n is a CallNode or a RegularNode then
16: if visit(icfg, n) = true then
17: tempList ← tempList ::: successors(n);
18: end if
19: end if
20: return tempList ;
21: end procedure
22: procedure visit(icfg, n)
23: if n is a CallNode then
24: (fMapForCs, factsToR)← reslvCall(icfg, n);
25: update callees’ EntryNodes with fMapForCs;
26: update ReturnNode(n) with factsToR;
27: else if n is an RegularNode then
28: for all p ∈ successors(n) do
29: entry(p)← entry(p) ∪ exit(n);
30: end for
31: end if
32: if any p ∈ successors(n) gets any new fact then
33: return true;
34: end if
35: return false;
36: end procedure
37: procedure reslvCall(icfg, n) . n is a CallNode
38: calleeSet ← getCallees(entry(n), callSig(n));
39: for all M ∈ calleeSet do
40: if (EntryNode M 6∈ N) then
41: addCFG(icfg,CFG(M));
42: E ← E ∪ (n,EntryNode M);
43: E ← E ∪ (ExitNode M,ReturnNode(n));
44: end if
45: end for
46: fToCallees ← empty;
47: factsMapForCallees ← emptyMap;
48: for all p ∈ successors(n) do
49: factsToCallee ← filterFunc(n, p, entry(n));
50: factsMapForCallees(p)← factsToCallee;
51: fToCallees ← fToCallees ∪ factsToCallee;
52: end for
53: factsToReturn ← exit(n) \ fToCallees;
54: return (factsMapForCallees, factsToReturn);
55: end procedure
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observes that entry(Return J9) contains heap-facts which show that field f of Instance J4 points to
the String “abc” at J8. This is the effect of J18. It is interesting to see that this is not true for
the same field (i.e.,f) of Instance J6 because no assignment like J18 happens inside A2.bar.
Now, we can get entry(J10), and continue to process until reaching the ExitNode.
The algorithm for the DFG building process is formally presented as Algorithm 2. This is a
fixed-point algorithm ( ref. the while loop from L9 to L13 ), which tracks what points-to facts reach
each statement from the given entry point (EP). The core of Algorithm 2 is L11 , which processes
different type of nodes in the control flow graph, and this is formally elaborated in Algorithm 3.
Algorithm 3 presents how to process each type of node (e.g., CallNode, ReturnNode, etc.). As an
example, if it’s a CallNode, the ICFG will be expanded by including the callee graph based on the
points-to facts flowing there. Algorithm 2 computes all the possible object point-to information
for each program points; therefore it is sound with respect to conservatively model the side-effect
could be introduced by library API calls.
3.1.3 Handle Library APIs
An app can call large number of library APIs (system or third-party), and it is not feasible to
track the flow facts inside all those APIs. Argus-SAF modeled thousands of library APIs to cover
critical data flows using the summary language discussed in Section 2.2.
3.2 Summary-based Bottom-up Data-flow Analysis (SBDA)
Android allows a developer to design a part or the complete app using native language
(C/C++) and allows Java code to communicate with native code bi-directionally using Java Na-
tive Interface (JNI). A comprehensive static analysis framework needs to be able to analyze both
languages and address there inter-language communication channels. However, there exists signif-
icant challenges for RFA to work in such an inter-language analysis setup:
1) Difference in intermediate data representation: Java data-flow analysis typically tracks points-
to facts, whereas binary data-flow analysis typically uses symbolic execution. Thus the two
analysis engines use different data representations in the analysis process, making it hard to
integrate. How to design a unified data-flow representation for both analyses is a challenge.
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2) Efficiency: Both Java data-flow analysis and binary symbolic execution are computationally
expensive. The traditional data-flow analysis requires propagating data-flow facts contin-
uously over the complete program’s control flow graph until a fixed point is reached. For
inter-language analysis, this means the analysis process need to switch between the java and
binary analysis context continually. This further exacerbates analysis time.
EP EP
Topological Sort and reverse.
∆(D)
Generate heap manipulation 
summary left to right.
Generate Call Graph
∆(C) ∆(B)
∆(A) ∆(EP)
> > > >
A
B C
D
EPABCD
Figure 3.2: SBDA workflow
To address above challenges, Argus-SAF adopt the Summary-based Bottom-up data-flow
Analysis (SBDA) algorithm introduced in [51]. The benefit of this method is that Argus-SAF
only needs to visit each method exactly once to generate a unified heap manipulation summary
for both Java and native procedures, while still preserving a flow and context-sensitive data-flow
analysis result.
Figure 3.2 illustrates the workflow of SBDA. It takes the environment method as EP and
generates a call graph G from it. From G Argus-SAF applies a topological sort algorithm with
the reverse order to get a list of method MList, which guarantees the callee method always comes
before the caller method. If there is a cycle in the call graph, the algorithm will break the cycle
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arbitrarily to make sure the topological sort will always hold. For each method Mi in MList,
Argus-SAF applies a heap manipulation summary generation algorithm to get summary ∆i. The
∆i is represented using the same DSL language as illustrated in Section 2.2.1. The callee method’s
summary will propagate to its caller methods until the EP is reached.
As discussed in [51], the soundness of a summary-based analysis is guaranteed if the summary
∆ over-approximates the heap manipulation side-effects. Therefore, SBDA is sound as long as the
summary generation process is conservative, which means conservative consideration of input data
and conservative model of library API calls.
∆(foo) = <(arg1.str = arg2) (sink(arg1.str)@C15)>
∆(bar) = <(sink(arg1)@C15)>
class Data {
public String str;
}
public void ep() {
String imei = source();
Data d = new Data();
foo(d, imei);
}
Data foo(d, imei) {
d.str = imei;
n_1(d);
}
void bar(imei) {
n_2(imei)
}
J2.
J3.
J4.
J12.
J17.
J18.
J19.
J20.
J21.
J22.
J23.
J24.
J25.
J26.
J27.
arg1
arg1
ep
foo
bar
Call Graph
Resolve J19. foo(d, imei)
d
sink(source@J17)@C15
2
4
5
n_2
void n_1(env, obj, d) {
jstring i = env->
GetObjectField(d , “str”);
env-> 
CallVoidMethod(“bar”, i)
}
void n_2(env, obj, imei) {
sink(imei)); 
}
C1.
C6.
C9.
C11.
C12.
C15.
C17.
MainActivity.java
multiple_interactions.cpp
n_1
∆(n_2) = <(sink(arg1)@C15)>
arg1
1
sink@C15
∆(n_1) = <(sink(arg1.str)@C15)>
strarg1
3
arg2
imei source@J17
Data@J18
str
Figure 3.3: Heap manipulation summary example
Let’s take Figure 3.3 as an example to walkthrough the heap manipulation summary gen-
eration process and how to leverage the summary ∆ to resolve the data-flow problem for the
motivating example. Start from method ep() Argus-SAF builds a Call Graph, and topological
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sort it in reverse order. For building the Call Graph, Argus-SAF needs to address the native
method call from Java code and Java method call (reflection style) from Native code, respectively.
The details are discussed in Chapter 5. Argus-SAF starts generating the summary ∆ from the
leaf function n 2(). Native function n 2() leaks the first argument 2 thus Argus-SAF generate
a summary ∆(n 2) = 〈(sink(arg1)@C15)〉 and propagate it to java method bar(). bar() pass
the first argument to n 2(), and the ∆(n 2) is applied. Therefore, Argus-SAF gets summary
∆(bar) = 〈(sink(arg1)@C15)〉 and propagate it to native function n 1(). n 1() read the str field
from first argument d and invokes method bar(). Therefore, ∆(bar) is applied and Argus-SAF gets
summary ∆(n 1) = 〈(sink(arg1.str)@C15)〉. foo() puts second argument imei into the str field
of first argument d and invokes native function n 1(). Argus-SAF applies ∆(n 1) and then get
∆(foo) = 〈(arg1.str = arg2)(sink(arg1.str)@C15)〉. Java method ep() assigns a sensitive data to
variable imei at J17 and creates a Data instance to d at J18. J19 of java method ep() invokes
method foo(). ∆(foo) tells us the str field of variable d gets data in variable imei which is sensitive,
and this str field of variable d will flow to a leak point at C15. Therefore, Argus-SAF captures the
data leakage problem.
3.3 Discussion
Currently, both data-flow analysis algorithms only do constant propagation for string values
and have a conservative model for string operations. This limitation could introduce imprecision
for the intent resolution and reflection call handling. Precise and general string analysis in static
analysis is non-trivial, and the author leaves this for future research. For example, prior research [52,
53] could be applied. Moreover, recent work [38] shows that ICC resolution can benefit from
domain knowledge and probabilistic models, which Argus-SAF could adapt to prioritize inferred
ICC destination choices.
RFA does not currently handle Java reflection, dynamic class loading. Adding preliminary
support for reflections and dynamic class loading is similar to handling ICC in Argus-SAF. More-
2First two arguments of native functions are not counted in the summary as env is not presented in java method
and obj is “this”.
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over, Li et al. [54] have proposed ways to handle Java Reflection and dynamic class loading in a
reliable way, which might be able to leverage in the future.
Both data-flow analysis algorithms’ data and control flow analysis depend on the faithfulness
of the models, including the models of the Android environment and its APIs. I designed a DSL as
discussed in Section 2.2 to let researchers more easily model library APIs for their analysis purpose.
Currently, there exist more than 1,000 API models using the DSL, which covers a significant portion
of the real-world Android API usage. However, due to the size of the Android library and complexity
of third-party libraries, it remains a challenge to reliably detect all library API and provide a precise
and sound model for them. Recent work [55,56,57] offer approaches to detect third-party libraries.
Prior work [58] shows that static analysis can compute accurate data-flow summary for the Android
framework. They might be able to leverage in the future.
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CHAPTER 4: COMPONENT-BASED ANALYSIS 1
An Android app might have multiple components while the components can communicate
with each other via various channels: Intent, RPC, static field. Thus, security sensitive data items
can also flow through these channels. Moreover, in an inter-app communication, one component
of app X interacts with one component of app Y; hence, communication across different apps can
be considered as inter-component communication. Thus, our approach considers the component-
based analysis as the basic building block for app vetting. Argus-SAF does both intra- and inter-
component analysis (covering both intra-app and inter-app analysis, if necessary). Our analysis
approach consists of the following phases:
1) Build data-flow graph (DFG) for each component (discussed in Section 4.2).
2) Build data dependency graph (DDG) for each component (discussed in Section 4.3).
3) Perform inter-component analysis (discussed in Section 4.4, 4.5, and 4.6).
4.1 Motivating Example
A malicious app can conduct bad behaviors by leveraging the design (e.g., event-driven and
inter-component nature) of Android system and try to obfuscate its real objectives. Figure 4.1
shows an example app (named “inter-component-leak”), which consists of a few components while
each one is a separate Java class. Android apps are component-based where each component is
an independent entity and is typically responsible for a specific task. For instance, an Activity
component implements the UI of the app, a Service component typically performs a long-running
task on the background, and a Broadcast Receiver component receives a broadcast message from
one component (or the system) and takes specific actions and more.
1This chapter is based on the authors TOPS 2018 [49] paper. See Appendix A for permission.
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An Android app does not have a “main” method; instead, components are invoked through
the various callback methods (including lifecycle methods). Depending on the events, the system
invokes the lifecycle methods of the components. It also remembers the recently sent intents and
passes them around, which can be abstracted in a component-level environment. Furthermore,
there can be control flow and data-flow among the app components through the Android system.
For a comprehensive analysis, the app analyzer tool needs to track such control and data flows.
As an example, the following sequence of events (as labeled in Figure 4.1) can happen in
reality:
1) FooActivity starts BarActivity (via “startActivityForResults ” API) and waits for BarActivity
to send back some result.
2) When the user clicks on a button of BarActivity screen, the onClick method is triggered.
3) BarActivity makes an RPC (Remote Procedure Call) call getImei() to a Service component
named MyService, and MyService returns an inner field (which has already possibly stored
the IMEI Id) to BarActivity.
4) BarActivity sends back an intent (via setResult API), which contains the IMEI Id.
5) Android system invokes the onActivityResult method of FooActivity with the above intent
as a parameter, and the IMEI Id is extracted and leaked (to the attacker) through an SMS
message.
To track the control and data-flow inside a component, a static analyzer needs a model of
the Android system to track invocation of the callback methods including the component lifecycle
methods as illustrated in the above example. Our model of the Android environment is inspired by
FlowDroid [19,30], which uses a “dummyMain” method to capture all possible sequences of lifecycle
method invocations as followed in Android. However, unlike an app-level environment model used
in FlowDroid, Argus-SAF designs a component-level environment model. The motivation behind
the component-level model choice is that Android apps work in this way.
Furthermore, Argus-SAF needs to track data and control flow through each type of inter-
component communication channel (such as Intent, RPC). As an example, when BarActivity sends
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public class BarActivity extends Activity {
private MyService s;
@Override
protected void onCreate(@Nullable Bundle savedInstanceState) {
super.onCreate(savedInstanceState);
setContentView(R.layout.activity_bar);
Intent i2 = new Intent();
i2.setClass(getApplicationContext(), MyService.class);
bindService(i2, mConnection, Context.BIND_AUTO_CREATE);
}
...
public void onClick(View view) {
if(s != null) {
String imei2 = s.getImei();
Intent i3 = getIntent();
i3.putExtra("key", imei2);
setResult(RESULT_OK, i3);
finish();
}
}
private ServiceConnection mConnection = new ServiceConnection() {
@Override
public void onServiceConnected(ComponentName name, IBinder binder) {
MyService.MyBinder b = (MyService.MyBinder) binder;
s = b.getService();
}
…
};
}
J1.
J2.
J3.
J4.
J5.
J6.
J7.
J8.
J9.
J10.
J11.
J12.
J13.
J14.
J15.
J16.
J55.
J56.
J57.
…
J67.
J68.
J69.
J70
J71.
J72.
J73.
J74.
public class FooActivity extends Activity {
@Override
protected void onCreate(@Nullable Bundle savedInstanceState) {
super.onCreate(savedInstanceState);
setContentView(R.layout.activity_foo);
Intent i1 = new Intent();
i1.setClass(getApplicationContext(), BarActivity.class);
startActivityForResult(i1, 1);
}
@Override
protected void onActivityResult(int requestCode, int resultCode, Intent data) {
String imei3 = data.getStringExtra("key");
SmsManager smsManager = SmsManager.getDefault();
smsManager.sendTextMessage("xxx", null, imei3, null, null); // sink, leak of device id
}
}
public class MyService extends Service {
private final IBinder mBinder = new MyBinder();
private String imei1 = null;
…
public void setImei() {
TelephonyManager m = (TelephonyManager) getSystemService(TELEPHONY_SERVICE);
this.imei1 = m.getDeviceId(); // source
}
public String getImei() {
return this.imei1;
}
}
J17.
J18.
J19.
J20.
J21.
J22.
J23.
J24.
J25.
J26.
…
J35.
J36.
J37.
J38.
J39.
J40.
J41.
J42.
J43.
J44.
J45.
J46.
J47.
J48.
J49.
…
J53.
J54.
Figure 4.1: The inter-component-leak App: The arrowed lines among the app components highlight
some of the inter-component communication
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out an intent i3 via setResult() API, the Android system invokes the onActivityResult method of
FooActivity with i3 (i.e., data = i3) as a parameter. The reason for the above action is that FooAc-
tivity has started BarActivity before with the startActivityForResults() API. To track the control
and data flow involved in such a “stateful” ICC (inter-component communication) mechanism, the
analyzer tool needs to remember which Activity has started a given Activity A. Another challenge
for the analyzer tool is how to track the RPC channel if any. As an example, when BarActivity
invokes the getImei() method, the analyzer tool has to map the call to the corresponding method
of MyService component. BarActivity receives some data flow as the return from the call. Further-
more, MyService might have been running already before this RPC takes place and has stored the
IMEI Id in field imei1 (e.g., because another RPC method setImei() got invoked by others), and
the getImei() call returns the sensitive information from imei1 to BarActivity. This shows that the
analyzer tool needs to address the re-entry nature of the component code. In addition to the above
channels of communication among app components, two components can also exchange data via
static variables and more. So, the app analyzer tool needs to track these channels too.
4.2 Building the Component-level Data-flow Graph
Argus-SAF computes points-to facts for each statement. In the component-based analysis,
Argus-SAF builds the DFG of each component of an app follow algorithm introduced in Section 3.1.
Figure 4.2 illustrates part of the resulting DFGs of the components in the example app.
During the intra-component analysis phase, one cannot tell what data will be received by this
component from others through inter-component channels, such as Intent, RPC, static field. Thus,
at any information retrieval point for those channels, a conservative model like that used in Sec-
tion 3.1.3 is applied. More detailed discussion on how to handle data flows across components will
be discussed in Section 4.4.
4.3 Building the Component-level Data Dependence Graph
A component-level data dependence graph (DDG) is derived from the component’s DFG .
With the help of DDG , Argus-SAF can determine which part(s) of the program a particular program
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public class BarActivity extends Activity {
public void onClick(View view) {
J37: String imei2 = s.getImei();
J38: Intent i3 = getIntent();
iJ39: 3.putExtra("key", imei2);
J40: setResult(RESULT_OK, i3);
J41: finish();
}    
}
public class FooActivity extends Activity {
protected void onCreate(…) {
J4: super.onCreate(savedInstanceState);
J5: setContentView(R.layout.activity_foo);
J6: Intent i1 = new Intent();
J7: i1.setClass(…, BarActivity.class);
J8: startActivityForResult(i1, 1);
}
protected void onActivityResult(…, Intent d) {
J12: String imei3 = d.getStringExtra("key");
J13: SmsManager smsManager = …;
J14: smsManager.sendTextMessage(…, imei3, …);
}
}
public class MyService extends Service {
public void setImei() {
J68: TelephonyManager m = …;
J69: this.imei1 = m.getDeviceId();
}
public String getImei() {
J72: return this.imei1;
}
}
<i1, J6>
<i1, J6>, <(J6, mComponentName), ”BarActivity”>
<imei3, ☐J12>
<imei3, ☐J12>
<imei2, ☐J37>
<imei2, ☐J37>, <i3, env>
<imei2, ☐J37>, <i3, env>, 
<(env, key), ☐J37 > , 
<(env, value), ☐J37 > 
<(this, imei1), IMEI@J69>
<(this, imei1), IMEI@J69>
1
2
4 3
Channel Send-points Receive-points
Intent 1. startActivity()@J8:
Intent@J6 with componentName(“BarActivity”)
1. ComponentName: FooActivity
2. IntentFilter: 
• action (“action.MAIN”)
• Category(“category.LAUNCHER”)
3. onActivityResult()
RPC
Static Field
FooActivity
Channel Send-points Receive-points
Intent 1. setResult()@J40 1. ComponentName: BarActivity
RPC 1. MyService.getImei()@J37 1. imei2@J37: return of MyService.getImei()
Static Field
BarActivity
Channel Send-points Receive-points
Intent 1. ComponentName: MyService
RPC 1. Return from MyService.getImei()@J72 1. Myservice.getImei()
Static Field
MyService
1
4
4
2
1
3
3 2
Figure 4.2: DFGs and STs of the components in App “inter-component-leak”: An excerpt
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point depends on. DDG is a directional graph; its node set is the same as the nodes in DFG and
has two types of edges:
1) Object dependence edge: Linking the use site of an instance to the creation site of the instance.
2) Variable def-use edge: Linking a use site of a variable to the def-site of the variable.
Since object flows in a component are captured in DFG , the constructed DDG automatically
captures data dependencies within the component boundary. As an example, in Figure 4.2, the
J14 in FooActivity uses imei3 while the entry of statement J14 has a fact 〈imei3, J12〉. This
tells us that the object 12 (generated at J12) is used in statement J14. Thus, there is a data
dependency path from J14 of the FooActivity to the def-site J12 in the same component.
4.4 Linking Inter-component Data Flows
When components interact through Inter-component communication (ICC) channels, the
data-flow facts will propagate from one component to another. There are a couple of challenges in
analyzing inter-component data flows for Android apps.
1) Android app components run concurrently, and their execution sequence can be arbitrarily
interleaving or parallel depending on the events that trigger the various call-back methods.
2) Android app components are stateful. After component A invokes ICC on component C and
changes its state, another component B may invoke ICC on C later and be impacted by the
effect of the previous ICC from A.
Figure 4.3a shows a case where a Service C has a field f and two RPC methods set() and
get() which set and get data from field f, respectively. These two RPC methods can be invoked in
any order with any data from all other components. For example, component A may set a sensitive
data into Service C’s field f, and component B could retrieve such data from C via the get() RPC
call later, forming an information flow path. Figure 4.3b shows another case where component A,
B share data via static field X.f, which can form an information flow path from A to B.
Traditional context-sensitive call graph generation cannot capture this type of information
flow from “stateful ICC.” In the above example, neither the call sequence A→ C nor B → C can
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(a) RPC (b) Static field
Figure 4.3: Data flow between app components via RPC and static field
capture the information flow A→ C → B. The information flow only happens through interleaving
the three components’ execution in the order {A, C, B, C}, where the first two captures the RPC
call A→ C and the latter captures the RPC call B → C. Such concurrency execution semantics
can be modeled by treating ICC in a context-insensitive manner and merging all the data-flow facts
at a component’s ICC entry point – simulating the effect of all possible orders of interleaving.
Based on this idea, one approach is to compute a global fixed-point among all the components
while flowing the points-to facts context-insensitively between components (intra-component data-
flow is still context-sensitive).2 The downside is that for any new set of components need to analyze,
Argus-SAF would have to re-compute the global fixed-point, making it impossible to re-use the
per-component analysis result. Thus, a different approach is adapted. When computing the DFG
for each component in the intra-component analysis phase, Argus-SAF assumes that any type-
compatible data is possible to enter the ICC channels. Besides, Argus-SAF book-keeps all the data
that may enter and leaves the component through the channels. In the inter-component analysis
phase, Argus-SAF then “stitch” the inter-component communication channels’ receive points with
2It is quite non-trivial to compute this global fixed-point while at the same time simulating the non-determinism
caused by the interleaving concurrent threads [50].
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the corresponding send points (between two different components), forming the inter-component
data dependence graph. This conservative approximation serves the purpose of our goal well with
following reasons:
1) Android is a component-based system, and any component may receive data from any other
component – not necessarily the ones in the same app; thus assuming any type-compatible
data may come into the ICC channel is consistent with Android’s execution semantics.
2) This reasoning model obviates the need for computing ICC call graphs, thus eliminates the
call graph explosion problem that may happen in other Android analysis tools, including the
original version of Amandroid [48].
3) By analyzing each component separately, it allows us to re-use the intra-component analysis
result for any further inter-component analysis, possibly involving different subsets of the
components. This will scale better with large volumes of apps and naturally extends to
inter-app analysis.
In the inter-component analysis phase, the DFG of all the involved components is loaded.
Based on the ICC channel book-keeping information Argus-SAF then finds the data dependence
between the sender and recipient points. The book-keeping information is stored in a data structure
called the summary table (ST). Argus-SAF generates an ST for each component C via processing
C’s DFG, where ST lists the communication channels through which C communicates with other
components. ST records specification of different types of channels including, e.g., Intent, RPC,
and static fields3. In particular, for each such channel, the ST of C records the following items:
1) send-points where C is the sender of the channel. The information recorded includes what
kind of data is sent (e.g., outgoing Intent value for an Intent channel) and the receiver’s name.
2) receive-points where component C is the receiver of the channel. The recorded information
includes receiver’s name which allows matching with other components’ send-points. For
3Files can serve as an inter-component communication channel like static fields, and can be handled in a similar
way. This would require a precise string value solver, which will be handled in future work.
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example, for Intent channel, the intent filter value; for RPC channel, the RPC method’s
signature, and so on. Table 4.1 lists the main items in an ST.
Table 4.1: Communication points of an app component
Channel Send-points Receive-points
Intent Outgoing Intent Intent Filter
RPC Method signature, params, return Method signature, params, return
Static Field Field signature to write, data Field signature to read
Figure 4.3 helps to discuss how the STs are constructed and used. There are three compo-
nents in Figure 4.3a, whose DFG has already been built. In component A, we saw an RPC call
C.set(d) that sends data d to Service C via the RPC channel C.set(). Argus-SAF adds this to the
RPC channel’s send-point description in A’s ST. Component B has an RPC call C.get() which
sends a request to Service C and expects a return value from it. Argus-SAF adds it to both the
send-point and receive-point description of B’s RPC channel. Service C has two RPC methods
C.set(x) and C.get(); Argus-SAF adds them to the receive-point of C’s RPC channel. C.get() is
returning an object to its caller; Argus-SAF adds it to the send-point of C’s RPC channel. Fig-
ure 4.3b shows the inter-component communication caused by the static field. Here the send-point
description indicates a write to the static field, and a receive-point description indicates a read
from the field. With the STs for each component constructed, Argus-SAF can “stitch” the send
and receive points of the channels between two components to identify all possible inter-component
data dependency. The “stitching” process is matching each channel’s send-point with receive-point
between two components based on channel specific criteria. For example, in Figure 4.3a Argus-
SAF can stitch component A’s send-point 1 to component C’s receive-point 1 because their method
signatures match. After “stitch” all the send-points and receive-points (the arrows shown in Fig-
ure 4.3a), we can easily see the information flow path from d in component A to leak in component
B.
In the next three subsections, the ST construction and this “stitching” process for each type
of ICC channels is further discussed.
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4.4.1 Intent
4.4.1.1 ST Construction
Section 4.1 illustrates that malicious apps can easily manipulate Android’s inter-component
communication (ICC) to leak sensitive data stealthily. To track data-flow through the Intent
channel, Argus-SAF needs to solve statically specific values for the intent involved. At a send-
point, Argus-SAF needs to solve for the Intent call parameters to infer the value of the outgoing
Intent so that Argus-SAF can match it with the correct receive-points. At the receive-point,
Argus-SAF needs to discover the Intent filter value so Argus-SAF can match it with the possible
send-points. Argus-SAF infers the Intent API call parameters and Intent filters using the points-to
facts computed and the app manifest file. This information will enable us to discover the source-
destination component pair of the Intent call in the inter-component analysis phase.
The destination of an Intent can be either explicitly or implicitly specified in the outgoing
intent. The standard way of creating an explicit intent is by adding the destination component’s
name using Android APIs such as setClass (J7 in Figure 4.2). For instance, at J8 in Figure 4.2
Argus-SAF can derive that the intent parameter i1’s field mComponentName is “BarActivity.”
This fact comes from the modeling of the API function setClass called at J7, which generates
a field-fact 〈(J6, mComponentName), “BarActivity”〉, where J6 represents Intent i1 which was
created at J6. Argus-SAF records the destination component name as a send-point in ST . Also,
Argus-SAF documents in ST whether the Intent caller expects a result is returning later from
the callee component (in case of stateful Intent call like “startActivityForResult” as opposed to
stateless Intent call like “startActivity,” “bindService”).
An implicit intent does not include the name of a specific destination component but instead
requests a general action to perform, and the System finds a capable component (from the same app
or another) which can fulfill the request. Some fields of an Intent object are used in this matching:
mAction (String), mCategories (set of String), mData (Uri), and mType (String). These intent
fields can be manipulated by invoking certain Android APIs. For instance, i.setData(Uri.parse(http:
//abc.com/xyz)), which sets the Uri corresponding to a http url to the mData field of an Intent i.
Through proper modeling of these API functions (Section 3.1.3), Argus-SAF can derive possible
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(String) values of the relevant fields of an Intent object, which the Android system bases its decision
on Intent destinations. Argus-SAF documents these fields of the Intent as send-points in ST .
4.4.1.2 Stitching Intent Channels – Intent Destination Resolution
For explicit intents, it is straightforward to find the correspondence between the source com-
ponent and the destination component. The matching information is directly available as the
send-point (in the ST) of the source component and as the receive-point (in the ST) of the destina-
tion component. For example, FooActivity has a send-point at J8 (startActivityForResult()) where
Intent i1 has the target component name set to “BarActivity,” which matches the receive-point in
the ST of BarActivity. Hence Argus-SAF discovers the correspondence.
However, tracking the “return” intent j sent by the callee component X in a stateful In-
tent is more complicated, e.g., the name of the destination component of the intent i3 sent
through the “setResult” API as in J40 of BarActivity is not available in the app code (nei-
ther in the ST of BarActivity). To know the possible destinations of intent j, Argus-SAF first
checks through all components’ ST to find each component Y which have initiated a stateful Intent
call (i.e.,startActivityForResult) to component X (e.g.,BarActivity). Then, Argus-SAF infers that
onActivityResult API of each component Y is receiving intent j as a parameter.
Furthermore, there are some challenges in resolving the target of an implicit intent. The
Android system finds the destination based on the intent fields as well as the manifests of all the
apps which specify intentfilters for a component. An intentfilter is an XML expression involving
the action tag, category tag, and data tag (which includes both Uri and type). The Android
system determines the destination of an implicit intent by applying a set of rules [59] matching the
relevant intent fields and the intent filter specification for every component of the system. Argus-
SAF implements all those matching rules, using the static analysis results that show the possible
string values of the relevant intent object fields. It runs a precise actiontest, categorytest, and
datatest (having both Uri and type) to find the destination component(s). Our static analysis can
readily handle Intent fields. For complicated String operations (e.g., concatenation in a while loop),
if Argus-SAF cannot infer the exact string value, it reports it as any string, ensuring the soundness
of our analysis. Argus-SAF can run the Uri test matching different parts of the Uri (e.g.,scheme,
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path, host, port) between the intent and an intent filter. Furthermore, Argus-SAF is also able to
find the specifications of dynamically registered Broadcast Receivers, if any.
4.4.2 RPC
4.4.2.1 ST Construction
Service provides the programming interface that a client component can use to interact with.
This allows a client component to send/receive data to/from the service via an RPC call. In the
example app of Figure 4.1, MyService defines an inner class MyBinder which extends the Binder
class and returns such a Binder instance in onBind() lifecycle method. MyBinder returns handle of
MyService which exposes two RPC methods, MyService.setImei() and MyService.getImei(). Bar-
Activity binds to MyService at J25 which uses a ServiceConnection defined at J45. After the bind
succeeds, it will set the above handle to the s field of BarActivity. At J37 when a user clicks on
a button at BarActivity, it will invoke the RPC call of MyService.getImei() to retrieve data from
MyService.
Fortunately, in static analysis, discovering the above RPC connection between two compo-
nents (intra-app, or Local Service) is straightforward. After resolve bindService() call at J25,
Argus-SAF knows the target service is MyService. Then at J37, Argus-SAF knows the target
method’s signature is MyService.getImei(). In addition to the Local Service (intra-app) case above,
there are two more cases, Messenger Service and AIDL (a.k.a. Remote Service), which allows both
intra- and inter- app RPC calls. For Messenger Service case, Argus-SAF first infers the Handler
type registered to the Messenger instance that used at the service side and marks the Handler’s
handleMessage() as the RPC callee. At the client side, Argus-SAF marks the invocation of Mes-
senger.send() as the RPC caller. AIDL case is like the local service case, Argus-SAF can resolve
the bindService() call to find target service and then find the RPC callee. For both the caller com-
ponent and the callee component, Argus-SAF documents the RPC method signature, parameters,
return variable (some as send-points and some as receive-points) in ST.
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4.4.2.2 Stitching RPC Channels
Argus-SAF first evaluates Intent channel of ST to find the binding relation between client
component and service component. Then, based on the binding relation to match the RPC caller
and callee. For Local Service and AIDL case, Argus-SAF matchs the call signatures to link the
RPC caller and RPC callees. For Messenger Service, Argus-SAF matchs the Messenger.send() to
Handler.handleMessage().
4.4.3 Static Field
4.4.3.1 ST Construction
Documenting static field is straightforward as each static field has its unique name. In our
ST, Argus-SAF needs to record from which program point which static field is read (receive-point)
or written to (send-point).
4.4.3.2 Stitching Static Field Channels
Argus-SAF needs to match the static field’s name at send-point and receive-point to make
the connection.
4.5 Building App-level Data Dependence Graph
After figuring out all the channel matchings, Argus-SAF connects the data dependency links
among components’ DDGs to build an app-level DDG . The time complexity of this stitching process
is in the worst case quadratic to the number of components being analyzed. Then Argus-SAF can
perform data dependency analysis of the app. For instance, to query the data leakage on the
example app in Figure 4.2, Argus-SAF can find a taint source at MyService.setImei() method –
any other component can use this RPC call to set the phone IMEI to the MyService.imei field.
Then at the MyService.getImei() RPC method the return point can get IMEI and return to J39
at BarActivity; then it puts this information into Intent i3’s mExtra field, and at J40 sends as a
result Intent to the caller component FooActivity. At FooActivity.onActivityResult(), J6 extracts
IMEI and sends it out via sendTextMessage(), which is a sink point.
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Since DDG is a directed acyclic graph, the complexity of shortest path finding is linear to the
number of nodes and edges, which in the worst case is quadratic to the size of all the components
combined. Thus, even if over-approximation in the Intent destination resolution resulted in spurious
data dependence paths, it will not have a substantial impact on the running time.
4.6 Inter-app Analysis
Inter-app communication is inter-component communication which passes control and data
across app boundaries. Thus, our component-based analysis can be directly used to perform the
inter-app analysis. However, it has some challenges.
1) Only a subset of ICC channels can be used for inter-app communication. For example, local
service does not support another app to bind to it; static field only allows the same app to
read and write as they run in the same JVM.
2) Multiple apps may share the same package and class name which can cause trouble for static
analysis tool if it is not aware of the different app contexts.
To address challenge (1)), Argus-SAF manages different scopes for different ICC channels.
When linking the inter-component data dependence, it knows which channel can across app bound-
ary. To address challenge (2)), Argus-SAF uses different class loaders for different apps, and in the
stitching phase, it adds origin information for each program point to avoid any naming conflict.
4.7 Using Component-based Approach for Security Analyses
Argus-SAF provides an abstraction of the app’s behavior in the forms of DFGs and DDGs.
They can be easily used for a number of useful security analyses as discussed below.
4.7.1 Data Leak Detection
A critical problem in app vetting is to find whether an app may leak any sensitive data.
Examples of sensitive data include user-login credentials (e.g., password), location information,
and so on. This can be performed through standard data dependence analysis using the DDG.
Given a source and a sink, one can find whether there is a path from source to sink in the DDG.
For instance, prior research [30,60] has documented a list of security-critical source and sink APIs,
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which can be used here. One could also customize the definition of the source and sink for the
specific problem at hand. DDG can only capture explicit information leaks. For information leaks
through controls (e.g., leaking conditionals through the branches) one would need to build a control
dependence graph, which can be obtained from the DFGs through the standard process [61].
Argus-SAF can perform a comprehensive analysis since it captures control and data flows
across the component boundaries through the Intent channel, RPC channel, and others so that
security problems like the one shown in Figure 4.1 can be captured.
4.7.2 Data Injection Detection
An app can have a vulnerability which allows an attacker to inject data into some internal data
structures, leading to security problems. Researchers [3] identified a subclass of this vulnerability
called intent injection. The attacker can send an ill-crafted intent to a public component of a
vulnerable app, which retrieves data from the incoming intent and uses it for security-sensitive
operations. For instance, the app’s logic can be such that the incoming intent determines the
destination of critical data flow — the URL of a backup server, the name of a file, the destination
component of an ICC call, phone number of an outgoing SMS, or others. As a result, the attacker
will be able to control the destination, which can lead to serious security problems.
Argus-SAF can detect this vulnerability using the DDG, by defining the source as the possible
entry point of attacker-controlled data (e.g., a public-facing interface), and the sink is the critical
parameters of the security-sensitive operations. If a data-dependency path exists between the
source and the sink, the attacker can potentially manipulate the parameters of the security-sensitive
operations.
4.7.3 Detecting Misuse of APIs
Another critical part of security vetting is to find if the developer (intentionally or unin-
tentionally) has inappropriately used a library API, which may lead to security problems. Past
research has applied static analysis to identify misuse of Crypto APIs [28] and SSL APIs [29]. The
main idea is to detect if the app satisfies a set of rules on the proper use of the APIs. For example,
if the parameters for calling the AES encryption method have certain values, the cipher will run in
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the insecure ECB mode. Argus-SAF can verify these rules by checking the possible values of the
parameter objects in a relevant API call by querying the DFGs.
4.8 Discussion
Argus-SAF can capture the parallel execution semantics at the inter-component level as
discussed in section 4.4. However, Android also allows general thread-based concurrent execution
within a component. This is not currently handled by Argus-SAF. The author leaves it as future
work to adequately account for all possible concurrent executions, by leveraging existing work such
as Indus [50].
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CHAPTER 5: NATIVE CODE RESOLUTION
As discussed in previous Chapters, many works [3, 17, 18, 19, 20, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 41, 62]
have design or utilize static analysis tools to detect security issues in Android applications. Only
a couple of them [41, 62] address security issues related to native code. However, none of them
can track precise inter-language data-flow. The existing state-of-the-art Android static analysis
frameworks, such as FlowDroid [19], DroidSafe [25], IccTA [26] and CHEX [3], do not currently
provide the capability to perform inter-language data-flow analysis or handle native components.
When encountering a native method invocation, all of the existing data-flow analysis frameworks
either apply a conservative model which assumes any data-flow could happen or ignore the side-
effects produced by the native call, which will cause major imprecision in the analysis result.
5.1 Background and Example
Below provides necessary background information to understand how Android native world
works, and how the inter-language communication is handled. A motivating example is also pro-
vided to discuss the challenges to track static data-flow for Android application with the native
world.
5.1.1 Native Code Usage Modes in Android
Android developers can introduce native code in two ways. In the first mode, the developer
can write certain functions in native language (C/C++) and include the compiled binary as a
shared object as part of the application. Those functions are then called by an Android component
that is still written in Java. In the other mode, a complete component can be written in native
code, and the Android runtime directly calls the life-cycle methods of the component in the native
code. Currently Android only allows the second mode for the Activity component (called native
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Activity). Whereas all four Android component types could involve native code through the first
mode.
5.1.2 Native Development Kit (NDK)
The Native Development Kit (NDK) [43] is a set of tools that allow designing part of the
Android application using native languages. NDK provides platform libraries to help manage
native Activity components and access physical device components. It uses Java Native Interface
(JNI) [63] as the interface via which the java and C++ components talk to one another. It is mainly
used in cases such as improving performance, reusing existing third-party C or C++ libraries, and
so on.
NDK together with JNI defines how java code sends data to native functions and receives
return values, and how native code creates/modifies/inspects java objects and invokes java methods.
Since Android 2.3, NDK provides a helper library which allows the developer to design a whole
Android Activity using native code. To precisely handle inter-language dataflow in Android, Argus-
SAF must have a comprehensive model for JNI and native Activity as explained in later Sections.
5.1.3 Binary Code Analysis
BitBlaze [64] is a hybrid binary analysis platform, which contains three components: 1)
Vine: a static analysis component that translates assembly to IR, which supports x86 and ARMv4
architectures; 2) TEMU : It enables whole-system monitoring and dynamic binary instrumentation;
3) Rudder : It utilizes Vine and TEMU to conduct symbolic execution.
BAP [65] is binary analysis platform which supports x86 and ARM architectures. BAP
re-designs Vine to assist its front-end features. After the IR translations process finished, BAP
conducts its back-end analysis in the IR granularity.
Angr [47] is a binary analysis framework that combines many existing program analysis
technique into a single, coherent framework, such as Dynamic Symbolic Execution, Veritesting ,
Value-Set Analysis (VSA). Angr leverages the IR lifter of Valgrind [66] to translate assembly to
VEX IR, With the aid of VEX IR, Angr provides analysis support for many architectures including
32-bit and 64-bit versions of ARM , MIPS , PPC , x86 . NativeDroid of Argus-SAF is built on top of
Angr and uses its SimProcedure and Annotation features to model NDK libraries and JNI functions.
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5.1.4 A Motivating Example
A malicious app developer can make use of NDK and develop part of the app’s functionality in
the Native world. Figure 5.1 illustrates an example app (named “inter-language-leak”). It consists
of two worlds, 1) Java world: An Activity component which loads a native library “multiple -
interactions” and imports two native methods propagateData() and leakImei(); 2) Native world:
Export two native functions which leverage NDK libraries to read Java objects and invoke Java
methods.
Resolving native method call is different from resolving regular java calls. To find the native
method callee, one has to know which native library is loaded by the instance. From the native
library Argus-SAF needs to know what native functions are exported, then Argus-SAF can find
the corresponding function as the native method callee.
To track the control and data-flow across language boundaries, a static analyzer must un-
derstand the semantics of both languages, as well as understand the inter-language communication
interface and APIs.
As an example, the following sequence of events (as labeled in Figure 6.1) can happen in
reality:
1) MainActivity invokes native method propagateData() and passes an object d which carries a
sensitive data.
2) Java test multiple 1interactions MainActivity propagateData() receives data, gets str field
(sensitive data) and then invokes java method toNativeAgain().
3) toNativeAgain() at MainActivity receives data and passes it to native method leakImei().
4) Java test multiple 1interactions MainActivity leakImei() will receive the imei and leaks to
the log.
To track the data and control flow across language boundary, a static analyzer needs to un-
derstand the bridge interface – JNI. For example, when MainActivity invokes propagateData() at
J23, the static analyzer needs to know: 1) the libmultiple interactions.so has been loaded at J7;
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MainActivity.java
J1.
J2.
J3.
J4.
J5.
J6.
J7.
J8.
J9.
J10.
J11.
J12.
J13.
J14.
J15.
J16.
J17.
J18.
J19.
J20.
J21.
J22.
J23.
J24.
J25.
J26.
J27.
J28.
C1.
C2.
C3.
C4.
C5.
C6.
C7.
C8.
C9.
C10.
C11.
C12.
C13.
C14.
C15.
JNIEXPORT void JNICALL
Java_test_multiple_1interactions_MainActivity_propagateData(JNIEnv *env, jobject thisObj, jobject data) {
jclass cd = env->GetObjectClass(data);
jfieldID fd = env->GetFieldID(cd, "str", "Ljava/lang/String;");
jobject imei = env->GetObjectField(data ,fd);
cd = env->FindClass(“test/multiple_interactions/MainActivity");
jmethodID gd = env->GetMethodID(cd, "toNativeAgain", "(Ljava/lang/String;)V");
env->CallVoidMethod(thisObj, gd, imei);
return;
} // ∆(propagateImei) = <(sink(arg1.str)@C15)>
JNIEXPORT void JNICALL
Java_test_multiple_1interactions_MainActivity_leakImei(JNIEnv *env, jobject thisObj, jstring imei) {
LOGI("%s", getCharFromString(env, imei)); // leak
return;
} // ∆(leakImei) = <(sink(arg1)@C15)>
package test.multiple_interactions;
public class Data {
String str;
}
public class MainActivity extends Activity {
static {
System.loadLibrary("multiple_interactions"); //"libmultiple_interactions.so"
}
public static native void propagateData(Data d);
public static native void leakImei(String imei);
@Override
protected void onCreate(Bundle savedInstanceState) {
super.onCreate(savedInstanceState);
setContentView(R.layout.activity_main);
TelephonyManager tel = 
(TelephonyManager)  getSystemService(TELEPHONY_SERVICE);
String imei = tel.getDeviceId(); // source
Data d = new Data();
toNative(d, imei);
}
private void toNative(Data d, String imei) {
d.str = imei;
propagateData(d); 
} // ∆(toNative) = <(arg1.str = arg2) (sink(arg1.str)@C15)>
public void toNativeAgain(String data) {
leakImei(data);
} // ∆(toNativeAgain) = <(sink(arg1)@C15)>
}
multiple_interactions.cpp libmultiple_interactions.socompile to
Figure 5.1: The inter-language-leak App: The arrowed lines among the app components highlight
some of the inter-language-communication
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2) the corresponding native function name is Java test multiple 1interactions MainActivity -
propagateData via applying naming convention. Furthermore, when native function Java test -
multiple 1interactions MainActivity propagateData() invokes MainActivity.toNativeAgain() at C9,
the static analyzer needs to model and analyze the reflection style JNI functions: 1) C4-C6 read
str field from data and assign to imei; 2) C7 and C8 construct a method identifier to java method
MainActivity.toNativeAgain(); 3) C9 invokes MainActivity.toNativeAgain() with parameter imei.
After resolving the native method call at J23 and J26 and the native reflection call at C9,
Argus-SAF can track data-flow between the two worlds. Then at C15, Argus-SAF will be able to
say that the variable imei to be written to the log is sensitive.
5.2 Resolving Native Method Calls
JNI allows two ways to resolve a native method call to a native function:
1) Default: Follow the naming convention in JNI specification [67] to generate corresponding na-
tive function name. For example, as Figure 5.1 illustrated, the corresponding native function
name for native method MainActivity.propagateData() is Java test multiple 1interactions-
MainActivity propagateData.
2) Dynamic register: JNI allows the developer to register native method signature to native
function mapping dynamically.
To assist data-flow analysis engine to find native method callee, the author proposes a Native
Method Mapping data structure. Native Method Mapping is a map where the key is the native
method signature, and the value is the corresponding native function name and the containing so
file.
Algorithm 5 shows the pseudocode for generating Native Method Mapping n map of a given
APK A. First, each class in A is visited. If class defined native methods, then follow Algorithm 4
to find the possible native function containing so files. For each native method in the class, native
function name funcName is generated following the naming convention. Then load each so file
nLib, and see if the funcName exists in nLib. If yes, add it to the n map. If not, continue checking
the dynamically registered function list for nLib and check if the method is dynamically registered.
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Algorithm 4 Resolve loaded library for class C
Input: all classes’ IR of A.
Output: Loaded library for class C, libNameSet
1: procedure resolveLibNameSet(A, C)
2: libNameSet← empty set
3: loadSigs← Set(“System.load()”, “System.loadLibrary()”, “Runtime.load()”, “Runtime.loadLibrary()”)
4: for all class ∈ A.getAllReachableClasses(C) do
5: clinit← class.getStaticInitializer();
6: for all invoke ∈ clinit.getInvokeStatements() do
7: if invoke.signature ∈ loadSigs then
8: libNameSet← libNameSet :: invoke.getValueForParameter(1)
9: end if
10: end for
11: end for
12: return libNameSet;
13: end procedure
If yes, add it to the n map. However, to obtain the dynamically registered functions for nLib is a
non-trivial work. The following approach is used.
5.2.1 Dynamic Function Register Resolution
As illustrated in Figure 5.2, JNI allows register dynamic function mapping by implementing
the JNI OnLoad() method. The JNINativeMethod structure contains the mapping information
between the native method name, signature and the corresponding native function pointer. C5-C8
defines a JNINativeMethod array gMethods to indicate the mapping for native methods foo() and
bar(), then C16 invokes RegisterNatives() with gMethods to register. The procedures of resolving
dynamic function register is as follows:
1) Dynamic register begins at JNI OnLoad() method, whose first argument is JavaVM *vm.
Therefore, Argus-SAF first constructs a fake pointer to the JNIInvokeInterface structure,
which has been modeled and attaches the initialized pointer to the first argument (register
R0) of JNI OnLoad().
2) Argus-SAF does the symbolic execution from the JNI OnLoad(). In this situation, Argus-
SAF needs to get the JNINativeInterface to make JNI calls. As Figure 5.2 illustrated,
JNI OnLoad() method will first declare an uninitialized JNIEnv *env variable. Then it
will call GetEnv() function from vm to initialize the env variable. Argus-SAF creates a
SimProcedure(GetEnv) to simulate this behavior. Argus-SAF constructs a fake JNINativeIn-
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Algorithm 5 Generate Native Method Mapping of APK A
Input: All classes’ IR of A.
Output: A’s native method to so file map, n map
1: procedure GenNativeMethodMap(A)
2: n map← empty map
3: for all class ∈ A.getClasses() do
4: nativeMethods← class.getNativeMethods();
5: if nativeMethods 6= empty then
6: libnames←resolveLibNameSet(A, class) . Invoke Algorithm 4
7: for all name ∈ libnames do
8: nLib← A.loadNativeLibrary(name);
9: for all method ∈ nativeMethods do
10: funcName← method.toJNIName();
11: if funcName ∈ nLib.getFunctionNames() then
12: n map(method)← (funcName, name);
13: else
14: dynamicMap← nLib .getDynamicRegisterFunctions();
15: if method ∈ dynamicMap then
16: n map(method)← (dynamicMap(method), name);
17: end if
18: end if
19: end for
20: end for
21: end if
22: end for
23: return n map;
24: end procedure
terface pointer outside the GetEnv() function and then attach to it. Then the env variable
constructed by JNI OnLoad() can be assigned and continue to propagate.
3) Argus-SAF hooks SimProcedure(RegisterNatives) to JNINativeInterface’s function pointer ta-
ble. When the symbolic execution engine executes SimProcedure(RegisterNatives), Argus-
SAF can get the memory address of the gMethods array, because each element is accessible at
a fixed offset through the JNINativeMethod structure. Argus-SAF can resolve each element
value of the gMethods based on the address and the structure of JNINativeMethod.
4) Each JNINativeMethod contains three elements, native method name, native method sig-
nature, native function address. Argus-SAF matchs the native method information from
SBDA and find its corresponding native function address. Then Argus-SAF can begin Native
Function Summary Builder from that address.
5.3 Leveraging Existing Binary Analyzer for Data-flow Analysis
There are a number of existing binary analysis tools [47, 64, 65]. Angr [47] is used in this
work. Angr is a general binary analysis platform which uses symbolic execution technique to recover
49
C1.
C2.
C3.
C4.
C5.
C5.
C6.
C7.
C8.
C9.
C10.
C11.
C12.
C13.
C14.
C15.
C16.
C17.
C18.
C19.
C20.
static JNINativeMethod gMethods[] = {
{"foo",    "(Ljava/lang/String;)V",  (void *) native_foo},
{"bar", "(ILjava/lang/String;)V", (void *) native_bar},
};
JNIEXPORT jint JNICALL JNI_OnLoad(JavaVM *vm, void *reserved) {
JNIEnv *env = NULL;
if (vm->GetEnv((void **) &env, JNI_VERSION_1_4) != JNI_OK) {
return -1;
}
…
if (env->RegisterNatives(clazz, gMethods, numMethods) < 0) {
return -1;
}
…
}
typedef struct {
const char* name;
const char* signature;
void*       fnPtr;
} JNINativeMethod;
jni.h
main.cpp
Figure 5.2: JNINativeMethod structure
precise CFG (called CFGAccurate) in binary and allows the user to perform an annotation-based
analysis. However, Angr is not aware of NDK library, JNI function, and Java object/method.
Therefore, it cannot be directly used to track data-flow in Android binaries.
To do NDK/JNI-aware data-flow analysis for Android binary, Argus-SAF leverages Angr ’s
symbolic execution engine and implements an Annotation-based Dataflow Analyzer .
Annotation-based Dataflow Analysis (ADA) leverages Angr ’s Annotation and SimProcedure
features and is NDK/JNI-aware. Annotation is a customizable interface which Angr uses to allow
users to define what kind of data needs to be carried in the state of symbolic execution process and
what’s the propagation rule. SimProcedure allows users to replace library function calls with a fake
function that models the original library function’s effect on the symbolic execution state.
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5.3.1 Custom Annotations
Two custom Annotations is designed to assist NDK/JNI-aware data-flow analysis:
1) SummaryAnnotation: Native code uses JNI functions to create/inspect/update Java objects,
invoke Java methods, catch and throw exceptions, etc. What’s more, native code can conduct
inter-component communication (ICC) with the aid of JNI functions. Therefore, NativeDroid
implements SummaryAnnotation to capture data related to java operations in native code.
2) TaintAnnotation: It annotates tainted data with information, such as, taint type (source or
sink), taint label, taint locations. There are two kinds of source and sink APIs in the native
world: 1) Linux system calls; 2) JNI functions which invokes java world methods. All of them
is annotated to capture all the possible taint information.
0 reserved0
... ...
34 *CallObjectMethod
… …
104 *SetObjectField
… …
169 *GetStringUTFChars
… …
JNIEnv * 0 reserved0
1 reserved1
2 reserved2
3 *DestroyJavaVM
4 *AttachCurrentThread
5 *DetachCurrentThread
6 *GetEnv
7 *AttachCurrentThreadAsDaemon
JavaVM *
JNINativeInterface JNIInvokeInterface
Figure 5.3: JNINativeInterface and JNIInvokeInterface structures
5.3.2 JNI Function Model
There are two key data structures in JNI, JNINativeInterface [68] and JNIInvokeInterface [69].
As Figure 5.3 illustrated, both of them contains a list of function pointers. JNIEnv * and JavaVM
* are the pointers which point to the head of each table.
1) JNINativeInterface provides JNI functions to create/inspect/update java objects, invoke java
methods, catch and throw exceptions, query java class information, etc. For example, the
CallObjectMethod function is used to call a java instance method from a native method;
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SetObjectField sets the value of an instance field of an object. As the native code of Figure 5.1
shows, each native function receives a JNIEnv * as its first argument and can invoke JNI
functions based on it.
2) JNIInvokeInterface provides JNI functions to create/destroy java VM, and allocate/discover
JNIEnv . EP of native Activity does not have JNIEnv * parameter. Therefore, the developer
needs to use GetEnv() function to discover the thread’s JNIEnv *. If the thread has not
been created, developer needs to use AttachCurrentThread() or AttachCurrentAsDaemon()
function to attach a thread and allocate JNINativeInterface.
Understanding the semantics of the aforementioned JNI functions are essential for ADA to
do NDK/JNI-aware analysis. Therefore, Argus-SAF needs to model each of the JNI functions in
JNINativeInterface and JNIInvokeInterface using the SimProcedure technique provided by Angr .
However, the invocation instructions for JNI functions are stripped in the released version of An-
droid applications, and the JNI function calls happen through the indirect jump in the function
pointer table of those two data structures. Therefore, Argus-SAF has to create a fake data struc-
tures to imitate JNINativeInterface and JNIInvokeInterface and set the corresponding function
pointers at each offset to address of our modeled SimProcedures.
… …
169 *SimProcedure(GetStringUTFChars)
… …
JNIEnv *
Fake JNINativeInterface
SimProcedure(GetStringUTFChars) {
TaintAnnotation: arg1 à ret;
}
Figure 5.4: GetStringUTFChars function model
Figure 5.4 illustrates our model of JNINativeInterface and its SimProcedure table. The model
of GetStringUTFChars indicates that the TaintAnnotation of the first argument is passed to return
value. For example, Figure 5.5 shows a native function getCharFromString that receives a JNIEnv
*env as its first argument at C1. It invokes GetStringUTFChars() function from env at C5. As
Figure 5.4 illustrated, GetStringUTFChars is the 170th element of JNINativeInterface. Therefore,
its offset to JNIEnv * is 169 ∗ 4 = 676 = 0x2A4. As the calling convention prescribed, the first
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C/C++ Source Code
Assembly
C1.
C2.
C3.
C4.
C5.
C6.
A1.
A2.
A3.
A4.
A5.
A6.
A7.
A8.
A9.
A10.
A11.
A12.
A13.
A14.
A15.
A16.
const char *getCharFromString(JNIEnv *env,
jstring string) {
if (string == NULL)
return NULL;
return env->GetStringUTFChars(string, 0);
}
.text:00000610 ; getCharFromString(_JNIEnv *, _jstring *)
.text:00000610                 PUSH            {R7,LR}
.text:00000612                 ADD             R7, SP, #0
.text:00000614                 MOVS            R2, #0
.text:00000616                 CMP             R1, #0
.text:00000618 BEQ             loc_628
.text:0000061A MOVS            R2, #0x2A4
.text:0000061E LDR             R3, [R0]
.text:00000620                 LDR             R3, [R3,R2]
.text:00000622                 MOVS            R2, #0
.text:00000624                 BLX             R3
.text:00000626                 MOVS            R2, R0
.text:00000628 loc_628                                 
.text:00000628 MOVS            R0, R2
.text:0000062A POP             {R7,PC}
.text:0000062A ; End of function getCharFromString(_JNIEnv *,_jstring *)
R0 = env
R2 = 0x2A4
R3 = R0 = env
R3 = R3 + R2 = env + 0x2A4 = address of GetStringUTFChars
L1.
L2.
L3.
L4.
Concise Process
Figure 5.5: getCharFromString function source code and assembly
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argument of each function is stored in R0 register. The register value update process is illustrated
in the Concise Process of Figure 5.5 which simplifies the procedures showed in Assembly code.
First, R0 register is assigned to the value of env (a pointer) parameter at L1. Second, R2 is
assigned to 0x2A4 at L2, which is the offset of GetStringUTFChars from JNIEnv *. Then, R3 is
updated with the value of R0 at L3, which equals the env parameter. Finally, add R2 to R3 to get
the address of GetStringUTFChars. BLX R3 instruction at A11 will call the GetStringUTFChars.
When ADA executes A11, it will call SimProcedure(GetStringUTFChars), which will propagate
any TaintAnnotations from the first argument to the return value.
5.3.3 Java Method Summary
As shown in Figure 5.1, C9 invokes CallVoidMethod() function which will make a java method
call, and the callee is MainActivity.toNativeAgain(). SBDA already generated a method summary
for MainActivity.toNativeAgain(), which is ∆(toNativeAgain) = 〈(sink(arg1)@C15)〉. The func-
tion model SimProcedure(CallVoidMethod) takes ∆(toNativeAgain) and operates on its arguments
to properly mark TaintAnnotations. For this case, the data.str will be marked as leak.
5.3.4 Inter-component Communication (ICC) Resolution
Native code can make inter-component communication (ICC) by invoking java ICC APIs. As
described in Section 4.4, the java code analysis has a comprehensive model for ICC , thus Argus-SAF
applies the same model in function model SimProcedure(CallVoidMethod) to capture the possible
ICC in native code.
5.4 Handling Native Activity
Android NDK allows the developer to develop Activity in pure native language since Android
2.3 [43]. There are two ways to implement a native Activity [70].
1) native activity.h: In this way, the app needs to include native activity.h header to implement
a native activity. It contains the callback interface and data structures that are required to
create a native activity. The default entry point is ANativeActivity onCreate function. NDK
allows developers to use a customized function name by specifying in Manifest.
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2) android native app glue.h: With include android native app glue.h, an app can utilize
android main as entry point function to implement a native Activity.
Algorithm 6 Collect Native Activity Info of APK A
Input: Manifest file and all classes’ IR of A.
Output: A’s native Activity information, native activities
1: procedure collectNativeActivityInfo(A)
2: native activities← empty set
3: manifest← A.getManifest()
4: for all compTag ∈ manifest.getComponentTags() do
5: compName← compTag.getAttribute(“android:name”)
6: compClass← A.getClass(compName)
7: if compClass.isChildOfIncluding(“android.app.NativeActivity”) then
8: map← compTag.getMetaDataMap()
9: libs← empty set
10: libName← map(“android.app.lib name”)
11: if libName = null then
12: libs← resolveLibNameSet(A, compClass) . Invoke Algorithm 4
13: else
14: libs← libs :: libName
15: end if
16: funcName← map(“android.app.func name”)
17: if funcName = null then
18: if libs = empty then
19: libs← A.getAllNativeLibs()
20: end if
21: for all lib ∈ libs do
22: if lib.hasSymbol(“android main”) then
23: libName← lib
24: funcName← “android main”
25: else if lib.hasSymbol(“ANativeActivity onCreate”) then
26: libName← lib
27: funcName← “ANativeActivity onCreate”
28: end if
29: end for
30: end if
31: native activities← (compName, libName, funcName)
32: end if
33: end for
34: return native activities;
35: end procedure
There are three important pieces of information needed for resolving a native Activity: name,
containing so file and entry function name. Algorithm 6 shows the pseudocode for collecting these
for all native Activities from an app A. Argus-SAF first iterates each component compClass in the
AndroidManifest.xml and find the native Activities by check whether compClass is or is the child
of “android.app.NativeActivity”. If compClass is a native Activity, Argus-SAF then read its meta-
data to obtain the libName. If did not get libName, Argus-SAF then evaluates compClass’s static
initializer ¡clinit¿ to find out the argument value for load library method calls, System.load(), Sys-
tem.loadLibrary(), Runtime.load(), and Runtime.loadLibrary(). Then assign it to libName. Argus-
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SAF read the “android.app.func name” from compClass’s metadata to obtain the funcName. If
“android.app.func name” does not exist, then the default entry function name is used. Argus-
SAF then checks if the default name is “android main” (the android native app glue.h case) or
“ANativeActivity onCreate” (the native activity.h case).
static void OnStart(ANativeActivity *activity) {
JNIEnv* env = activity->env;
activity->vm->AttachCurrentThread(&env, 0);
jobject context = activity->clazz;
jstring imei = getImei(env, context);
LOGD("Device ID: %s", 
getCharFromString(env, imei));
}
static void OnResume(ANativeActivity *activity) {…}
void ANativeActivity_onCreate(ANativeActivity *activity, void *savedState, size_t savedStateSize) {
activity->callbacks->onStart = OnStart;
activity->callbacks->onResume = OnResume;
…
}
0
ANativeActivity
Callbacks*
callbacks
1 JavaVM* vm
2 JNIEnv* env
… …
ANativeActivity
0 *onStart
1 *onResume
… …
ANativeActivity
Callbacks
C1.
C2.
C3.
C4.
C5.
C6.
C7.
C8.
C9.
C10.
C11.
C12.
C13.
Figure 5.6: native activity.h example
5.4.1 native activity.h
As Figure 5.6 illustrated, the default EP of the native Activity is ANativeActivity onCreate
(NDK also allows developers to use a custom EP). ANativeActivity * is the first parameter whose
first member is ANativeActivityCallbacks *callbacks. ANativeActivityCallbacks structure contains
the callback functions which will be executed in the native activity lifecycle. However, when Argus-
SAF conducts the ADA from EP , the symbolic execution engine cannot execute those callbacks,
as there are no explicit calls. To comprehensively model this type of native Activity Argus-SAF
takes a two-fold approach:
1) Resolve callback function address: As illustrated in Figure 5.6, the ANativeActivity onCreate
function assigns the callbacks to the corresponding index of ANativeActivityCallbacks struc-
ture. Argus-SAF applies symbolic execution on this EP to get addresses of those callbacks
and its index in ANativeActivityCallbacks structure.
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Argus-SAF first construct a fake ANativeActivityCallbacks structure. Argus-SAF then con-
struct a fake ANativeActivity structure and map the fake ANativeActivityCallbacks structure’s
pointer to the ANativeActivity structure. Finally, Argus-SAF assigns the pointer to the fake
ANativeActivity structure to the first argument (R0 register) of ANativeActivity onCreate.
Argus-SAF does the under-constrained symbolic execution from ANativeActivity onCreate
function. After the symbolic execution has finished, the elements of ANativeActivityCallbacks
will be assigned real addresses of those callbacks.
2) Explicitly invoke callback functions: Argus-SAF hook each callback function to ANativeAc-
tivity onC- reate and apply ADA from ANativeActivity onCreate as the EP . One challenge
here is when native Activity invokes JNI functions. As illustrated in Figure 5.6, there are
no JNIEnv * in the EP , and the ANativeActivity structure’s JNIEnv * is uninitialized. The
developers need to invoke AttachCurrentThread on JavaVM * to assign env like in C2 and
C3. In ADA, Argus-SAF applies SimProcedure(AttachCurrentThread) to assign env element.
After the env element is assigned, the ADA will be able to resolve JNI functions correctly.
int32_t handle_input(struct android_app* app, AInputEvent* event) {…}
void handle_cmd(struct android_app* app, int32_t cmd) {…}
void android_main(struct android_app* state) {
…
state->onAppCmd = handle_cmd;
state->onInputEvent = handle_input;
// Read all pending events.
while (1) {…}
}
0 …
1 void (*onAppCmd)
2 int32_t (*onInputEvent)
3 ANativeActivity* activity
… …
android_app
C1.
C2.
C3.
C4.
C5.
C6.
C7.
C8.
C9.
Figure 5.7: android native app glue.h example
5.4.2 android native app glue.h
As illustrated in Figure 5.7, android main is the EP , and the only argument is the an-
droid app * state. There are two important callback function pointers in android app structure,
onAppCmd and onInputEvent. onAppCmd is used for activity lifecycle events, and onInputEvent is
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used for input events. Developers need to provide their processing functions to the two callbacks.
These callbacks will be triggered when activity and an input event occur, respectively.
To comprehensively model this native Activity type, Argus-SAF applies a similar approach
as used to resolve ANativeActivity onCreate. Firstly, Argus-SAF run symbolic execution from
android main to resolve the two callbacks value. Then, Argus-SAF hook the two callbacks to
android main function and run ADA.
5.5 Discussion
The inter-language related operations such as JNI reflection call construction, dynamic func-
tion registration, and Intent value resolution, all require precise resolution of string values. Argus-
SAF does constant string propagation in both Amandroid and NativeDroid . If the string is manipu-
lated, Argus-SAF will not be able to construct the precise value. Precise string analysis is expensive
and non-trivial in both java analysis and binary analysis as mentioned in prior research [52,53,71].
The author leaves this for future research.
Argus-SAF inherits path explosion issues from Angr [47]. Control-/Data-flow analysis of
NativeDroid is mainly based on the symbolic execution engine of Angr. Path&State explosion
is the natural defect of any symbolic execution techniques when encountering large programs as
the analysis need to separate all the states for different execution paths. To alleviate explosion
problem, NativeDroid needs to better constrain the possible execution paths and states which are
non-trivial [72]. These limitations will be handled in future work.
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CHAPTER 6: DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION
Argus-SAF is a precise, general and efficient Android static analysis framework that leverages
the Asndroid system model, component-based analysis and inter-language analysis discussed in pre-
vious three chapters. Argus-SAF consists of Amandroid , NativeDroid and JNI Bridge. Amandroid
is responsible for Dalvik-bytecode (java world) analysis, which I built from scratch. NativeDroid is
responsible for binary code (native world) analysis, which is built on top of Angr [47]. NativeDroid
implements the ADA algorithm described in Section 5.3. JNI Bridge is the middle layer that assists
the control and data communication between Amandroid (implemented in Scala 1) and NativeDroid
(implemented in Python). JNI Bridge leverages jpy [73], a bi-directional Java-Python bridge to
enable Amandroid and NativeDroid transfer control and data.
Environment 
Model
APK 
PreprocessAPK
Intra-
component 
Analysis
Inter-
component 
Analysis
Data leak detection plugin
Intent injection detection plugin
API misuse detection plugin
Other security analysis plugins
DFG & DDG & ST & ADDG
Figure 6.1: The Argus-SAF analysis pipeline
1Scala is a JVM-based language.
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Figure 6.1 illustrates the pipeline of Argus-SAF which consists of four major steps:
1) APK Preprocess collects useful information from an app.
2) Environment Model generates environment model for both Java and native components.
3) Intra-component Analysis computes information flow for each Android component in a native-
aware fashion.
4) Inter-component Analysis link inter-component data flows.
The output of Argus-SAF is the data-flow graph (DFG), data dependence graph (DDG), summary
table (ST) and app-level data dependence graph (ADDG), which can be applied in various types of
security analysis. For example, one can use DDG or ADDG to find whether there is any information
leakage from a sensitive source to a critical sink by querying whether there is a data dependency
chain from source to sink.
Environment ModelAPK PreprocessAPK
.so
.so
.so
.dex
.dex
.dex
Manifes
t & ResManifes
t & ResManifest 
& Res
Resources 
Parser
DEX2IR
IR_Pilar
Component Info
Native Info 
Analyzer
pyvex
JNI Bridge
Native 
Method 
Mapping
Amandroid
NativeDroid
IR_VEX
Native 
Activity 
Info
Java 
Component 
Environment 
Builder
Native 
Component 
Environment 
Builder
Env
Figure 6.2: APK preprocess and environment model
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6.1 APK Preprocess
The first half of Figure 6.2 illustrates the APK preprocess steps. Argus-SAF takes an APK as
the analysis input. It decompiles the APK into three parts, dex files, Manifest&Resource files and
so files. Amandroid leverages the DEX2IR and Resources Parser to decompile Dalvik bytecode into
Intermediate Representation (IR) language Jawa 2 and collect component information. NativeDroid
uses pyvex from Angr to translate binary into VEX IR [76].
The Native Info Analyzer receives information from DEX2IR and Resources Parser to com-
pute native world related information:
1) Generate Native Method Mapping following Algorithm 5 described in Section 5.2.
2) Collect Native Activity Info following Algorithm 6 described in Section 5.4.
6.2 Environment Model
Android is an event-based system, and as such no single method can be used as EP for
the data-flow analysis. To capture all lifecycle and event control-/data-flow of an Android java
component and to generate EP for data-flow analysis, APK Preprocessor implements the algo-
rithm 1 described in Section 2.1 to build environment model for each Android java component, and
generates an Environment Method as the EP for each java component.
Native Component Environment Builder is implemented by following the solution described
in Section 5.4 to generate an Environment Function as the EP for each native Activity component.
The Environment Method/Function explicitly invokes the event/lifecycle callbacks as the
Android runtime would.
2 Jawa language is designed based on Pilar, a language used in static analysis and model checking frameworks
such as Bakar Kiasan [74] and Bakar Alir [75]. Jawa is a structured and annotation based language, where user
can add different types of annotations to support different languages. This gives the flexibility to extend Argus-SAF
to support analysis for other frameworks and languages in the future. Jawa language specification is available at
http://pag.arguslab.org/jawa-language.
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6.3 Intra-component Analysis
As described in Chapter 4, Argus-SAF first needs to conduct intra-component data-flow
analysis to capture all intra-component-level behaviors. Argus-SAF has following two workflows to
works with pure java Android application and Android application with native code, respectively.
6.3.1 RFA-based Analysis
RFA-based Analysis
Data-flow Graph
(DFG)
Builder
Env
Data Dependent Graph
(DDG)
Builder
DFG Data-flow 
Analysis 
Result
Amandroid
Figure 6.3: RFA-based analysis
Figure 6.3 illustrates the main steps for RFA-based analysis. It follows the intra-component
analysis approach discussed in Chapter 4. It computes the intra-component level Data-flow Graph
(DFG) using the data-flow analysis algorithm discussed in Section 3.1. The DFG contains a ICFG
to represent the whole control-flow within a component, and for each program point it maintains
the points-to information. Leveraging the DFG , RFA-based analysis then computes the intra-
component Data Dependent Graph (DDG).
6.3.2 SBDA-based Analysis
Argus-SAF implements the Summary-based Bottom-up Data-flow Analysis (SBDA) algorithm
by following the techniques described in Section 3.2. As presented in Figure 6.4, it consists of the
following components.
6.3.2.1 Call Graph Builder
It receives the environment method/function from Environment Model and uses it as the EP
to compute a native-aware call graph. Unlike traditional java call graph building algorithm, our
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Figure 6.4: SBDA-based analysis
call graph will not stop at native method calls. Instead, it will evaluate the corresponding native
function to address possible reflection call from native to java and add those call target as callee of
this native method. The native reflection style call is resolved by following the JNI function model
described in Section 5.3.
6.3.2.2 Bottom-up Summary Propagator
It receives the call graph CG from Call Graph Builder and applies a topological sort with
the reverse order to get a list of method/function MList. It iterates the MList to send the work
order to corresponding Method/Function Summary Builder to compute summary ∆ and propagate
to their callers.
6.3.2.3 Java Method Summary Builder
Argus-SAF leverages the RFA engine to compute the summary for a given method. The
difference is that an intra-procedural analysis is applied. When the engine reaches a method call,
it will not flow the points-to facts into the callee. Instead, it will obtain the summary ∆(callee)
and apply such summary on current points-to facts to imitate the heap manipulation behaviors.
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When data-flow analysis finishes, Argus-SAF collect the heap manipulation behavior of the current
method and generate a summary ∆(method).
6.3.2.4 Native Function Summary Builder
Upon receiving a work order with native method signature and the containing so file, the
Native Function Summary Builder first identifies the binary address for the corresponding native
function of the native method. Then it applies ADA (as described in Section 5.3) to generate ∆
starting from such EP as follows.
1) Add SummaryAnnotation to each argument including argument index and type information,
because from EP ’s perspective all mutable arguments are considered as HeapBase.
2) Add SimProcedure to all JNI functions which might create/delete/manipulate the heap of java
objects. When ADA evaluates, those SimProcedures will adequately update and propagate
SummaryAnnotation. As an example, native code can construct java String with the aid of
JNI function NewString() or NewStringUTF(), JNI function SetObjectField() will set data to
a java object.
3) When ADA encounters any method/function invocation, it will check whether it is a source
or sink API. If so ADA will add TaintAnnotation to proper HeapLocs. For method invoca-
tion, Argus-SAF will also check with SBDA to obtain its ∆ and apply it on the arguments
SummaryAnnotations.
4) When ADA is over, Argus-SAF extract the SummaryAnnotation together with TaintAnno-
tation related to each argument and return node (if the JNI function returns a java object)
to build the summary.
Argus-SAF takes Java test multiple 1interactions MainActivity propagateData() function
at Figure 5.1 as an example to walkthrough the native function ∆ building process. Java test multi-
ple 1interactions MainActivity propagateData() function receives one argument data. Argus-SAF
assigns SummaryAnnotation(arg1, test.multiple interactions.Data) to data and SummaryAnnota-
tion(arg1.str, ‘java.lang.String’) to data.str. C6 invokes GetObjectField() to read str field of data
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to variable imei. SimProcedure(GetObjectField) get SummaryAnnotations from data.str and prop-
agate it to variable imei. C9 invokes java method toNativeAgain() and pass imei as the first
argument. SimProcedure(CallVoidMethod) obtain ∆(toNativeAgain) from SBDA, and apply on
SummaryAnnotations of imei, Argus-SAF then gets TaintAnnotation(sink(arg1.str), ‘C15’). After
finish running ADA, Argus-SAF collects the SummaryAnnotations and TaintAnnotations related
to each argument (there are no return value in this case). Finally, Argus-SAF checks the heap
changes of each HeapBase and taint informations to construct the summary ∆(propagateImei) =
〈(sink(arg1.str)@C15)〉.
6.4 Inter-component Analysis
Inter-component Analysis
Summary 
Table
(ST)
Builder
App-level Data Dependent Graph
(ADDG)
Builder
STData-flow 
Analysis 
Result
Amandroid
Figure 6.5: Inter-component analysis
Resolving Inter-component communication (ICC) is essential for any Android static analysis
tool. Argus-SAF implements the Summary Table (ST) building algorithm discussed in Section 4.4.
The Inter-component Analyzer collects ICC information from all Java components and native Ac-
tivity components. Then, it computes ST for each component and uses Component-based Analysis
to address ICC data-flow.
6.5 Distributed Computation
Argus-SAF’s modules are implemented using Scala, leveraging Akka’s actor-model [77] to
achieve distributed computation. Actor-model is a mathematical model of concurrent computation
that treats “actors” as the universal primitives of concurrent computation [78]. Each actor is a
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Figure 6.6: Argus-SAF actor model
computation unit which maintains its private state and can only affect each other through messages
to avoid usage of any locks.
As Figure 6.6 indicates, Argus-SAF’s phases are encapsulated as actors whereas each of them
maintains its own state and behavior. Argus-SAF Supervisor Actor is responsible for handling the
user’s app analysis request and dispatching orders to individual worker actors and based on the
response (of worker actors) moving the analysis to the next phase. Each phase of the analysis has
multiple worker actors that perform the computation concurrently, leveraging parallel computing
power. The actors communicate with each other with only a small amount of data; thus Argus-SAF
could run in a highly distributed fashion.
The component level DFG , DDG , and app metadata make the core information to be used
in the security analysis phase. New security analyses may be needed to be performed from time
to time while the required core information is the same for the same app. Thus, storing the core
information can save a tremendous amount of computing time. However, the data dependency
graphs can be quite big (GBs for a typical app). Thus, Argus-SAF does not attempt to store the
graphs, but rather only store the data-flow facts computed during the static analysis phase. The
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graph structure can be reconstructed efficiently when needed. This staging strategy is illustrated in
Figure 6.6. Apk Info Collect Actor and Points-to Analysis Actor store the collected apk information
and computed dataflow facts into the stage database, which can be used to rebuild the component-
level DFGs, DDGs for the Security Analysis Actor . The data-flow facts stored in the database does
not take much space — few MBs for an app.
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CHAPTER 7: EVALUATION 1
This dissertation evaluated Argus-SAF extensively on benchmark and real-world apps. Sev-
eral sets of apps have been used in the experiments:
1) 2,300 popular apps from Google Play (GPlay).
2) 2,300 randomly selected malware apps from the AMD dataset [9] (MAL).
3) 100,000 randomly selected popular apps from AndroZoo [79] (ZOO).
4) 24,553 malware apps from the AMD dataset [9] (AMD).
And three benchmarks (hand-crafted apps by other researchers and me). This chapter describes
the results of those tests. The experiments were run on a machine with 2.20 GHz, 48-core Xeon,
and 256 GB RAM.
7.1 Performance and Scalability
7.1.1 Component-based Analysis
Argus-SAF offers the user options of choosing multiple precision levels. For instance, the
context depth k (of the control flow graph) serves as a parameter to set the trade-off between
precision and performance. Our reported experiment results correspond to k = 1 (unless otherwise
mentioned), meaning that the static analyzer tracks up to one calling context. Argus-SAF also
allows the user to define the scope of the analysis by applying the conservative model for certain
third-party libraries (section 3.1.3). In our experiment, Argus-SAF applied the conservative model
for about 100 well-known third-party libraries.
The most computation-intensive step in component-based analysis module of Argus-SAF is
building the DFG for each component. Once the DFG is built, the running times of the subsequent
1This chapter is partially based on the authors CCS 2014 [48] and TOPS 2018 [49] papers. See Appendix A for
permission.
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Figure 7.1: Time to build DFG
analyses are negligible – these include building ST, DDG and running the specialized analyses on
top of them. Figure 7.1 presents the time is taken by Argus-SAF to construct DFG for 4,600
real-world apps (GPlay and MAL).
These apps have 141319.50 lines of bytecode instructions on average. The median running
time for computing the DFG for all the components in an app is 3 minutes; the minimum is 0.15
seconds whereas the maximum is 169 minutes. The scatter plot shows both the running time and
the size of the app (in a number of bytecode instructions).
7.1.2 Inter-language Analysis
This dissertation evaluated inter-language analysis module of Argus-SAF on ZOO and AMD.
SBDA is the core engine and the most computation-intensive step in inter-language analysis
module of Argus-SAF. Figure 7.2 presents the time taken to construct SBDA for 10,000 randomly
picked real-world app components. These components reach 144 methods on average. The average
running time for computing the SBDA for each component is 42.288 seconds; the minimum is 0.001
seconds whereas the maximum is 86 minutes.
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Figure 7.2: Time to run SBDA
This dissertation constructed a separate experiment focused on the running time for native
code analysis. Figure 7.3a illustrates the time taken to build function summary for 2,000 randomly
picked real-world app native functions (from ZOO and AMD). These native functions reach 4,417
instructions on average. The average running time is 88.982 seconds; the minimum is 0.107 seconds
whereas the maximum is 136 minutes. Figure 7.3b illustrates the time taken to construct native
Activity analysis for all 579 native activities in ZOO and AMD (failed to analyze 33 due to path
explosion problem). These native activities reach 41,285 instructions on average. The average
running time is 570.513 seconds; the minimum is 0.247 seconds whereas the maximum is 438
minutes.
7.2 Intent Resolution Effectiveness
This dissertation evaluates Argus-SAF on all 4,600 real-world apps in our dataset, to calculate
the precision of the Intent resolution. As Table 7.1 indicates, in GPlay 21,062 ICC calls require
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(a) Function summary builder
(b) Native Activity analysis
Figure 7.3: Native code analysis performance
71
Intent resolution, and Argus-SAF can infer precise Intent string values for 17,354 (89%) of them.
In MAL apps, 18,749 ICC calls require Intent resolution, and Argus-SAF can infer precise Intent
string values for 13,883 (80%) of them. Overall 85% of the ICC cases can be precisely resolved,
showing that Argus-SAF’s Intent resolution is capable of handling real-world apps and will not
introduce too much over-approximation for ICC data flows.
Table 7.1: Intent resolution precision
Dataset GPlay MAL Total
Total Intent invocation point 21,062 17,354 38,416
Precise Intent resolution 18,749 13,883 32,632
Precision 89% 80% 85%
7.3 Statistics of Native Library Usage
Native library usage on both ZOO and AMD is collected. As Table 7.2a indicates, the overall
native library usage is reasonably high no matter in benign dataset or malware dataset. ZOO has
much higher native library usage than AMD which means there are many benign use cases for native
libraries, so native library existence is not a good indicator for detecting Android malware. Dig
into the detail of native library and understand its behavior is needed. The author also found cases
where an app has native methods but no .so files. This means the .so file is probably downloaded
at runtime (in which case no static analyzer will be able to identify). This dissertation found native
Activity usage in both ZOO and AMD , which shows the necessity of handle such case.
Table 7.2b lists the usage of different architectures. Overall, 32-bit architecture has much
higher percentage over 64-bit architecture. ARM is the most popular architecture for Android.
Not surprisingly most of the binaries are in ARM architecture.
The native library can invoke java method through reflection style function calls. The author
conducted an experiment to study the capability of NativeDroid to resolve such calls, and the
results are shown in Table 7.2c. The author also studied the distribution of those reflection call
targets and found that the majority of the reflection calls (especially from AMD) are targeted
to library APIs as oppose to App methods. Argus-SAF experiences poor performance on ZOO
reflection call resolving due to the larger code base and complex logic in market apps as opposed to
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Table 7.2: Native library statistics for datasets
(a) Native library usage.
ZOO AMD ZOO AMD
Total App a 99,910 24,384
Has Native b 39,661 5,365 / Total App 39.7% 22.0%
Has .so File 35,705 5,164 / Has Native 90.0% 96.2%
Has Native Method 32,576 3,867 / Has Native 82.1% 72.1%
Has Native Activity 583 29 / Has Native 1.5% 0.5%
Native Method 4,232,699 112,000 / Has Native Method 106.7 29.0
Pass Data 3,661,881 90,212 / Native Method 86.5% 80.5%
Pass Object 1,496,911 45,981 / Pass Data 35.4% 51.0%
aArgus-SAF failed to analyze a few apps that use advanced obfuscation.
bHas Native = Has .so File ∪ Has Native Method ∪ Has Native Activity.
(b) Architecture.
ZOO AMD ZOO AMD
Total .so File 235,616 16,116
ARM 162,356 13,792 / Total .so File 69.0% 85.6%
ARM 64 10,111 2 / Total .so File 4.3% 0.01%
X86 37,745 1,149 / Total .so File 16.0% 7.1%
X86 64 8,511 2 / Total .so File 3.6% 0.01%
MIPS 9,658 770 / Total .so File 4.1% 4.8%
MIPS 64 2,477 2 / Total .so File 1.1% 0.01%
Other 4,758 399 / Total .so File 2.0% 2.5%
(c) Reflection call.
ZOO AMD ZOO AMD
Total Reflection
Call
7,664a 33,497
Resolved Call 4,744 29,336 / Total Reflection
Call
61.9% 87.6%
Library API Call 2,555 24,249 / Resolved Call 53.9% 82.7%
App Method Call 2,189 5,087 / Resolved Call 46.1% 17.3%
aDue to time constraint Argus-SAF only finished analyzing 37,781 native functions from ZOO .
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malware apps. From the obtained reflection call list, the author sees many interesting library APIs
being called, such as SmsManager.sendDataMessage(), ClassLoader.loadClass(), which might raise
red flags.
7.4 Application to Security Analysis
Argus-SAF is a highly extensible framework that allows analysts to write customized security
checkers as plugins on top of it. This section reports experimentation results for most of Argus-
SAF’s security analysis plugins. All experiments are done using the GPlay and MAL datasets
(real-world apps).
7.4.1 Password Leakage Checker
This dissertation used the following policy to vet apps for adequately handling user passwords:
“password should not be saved in the device (not even when encrypted) and should be transferred
to a remote server only via HTTPS.” (similar guidelines can be found in, e.g., [80]). Argus-SAF
can be readily used to verify whether the input app obeys such a policy. The only “to-do” task
is to identify which variables in the app’s code corresponds to a password object (source), and to
define the potential leaking sinks.
Argus-SAF finds the TextView item corresponding to a password (when the inputType at-
tribute’s value is textPassword) in an app’s layout file and identify its unique ID. Argus-SAF then
looks for the usage of this particular ID in method call Context.getViewbyId(x), which is done
through a standard reaching-definition analysis on the intra-procedural control-flow graph2; this
method returns an EditText object y, and y.getText() gives the password object. Argus-SAF can
then define this object as the source. Argus-SAF prepares the list of sink APIs by considering
the relevant I/O operations (e.g.,Log.i(key, value), and URL.openconnection()). The rest of the
analysis is the straightforward application of DDG as explained in Section 4.7.
Argus-SAF found several examples of password leakage. Table 7.3 show part of the results.
A few interesting patterns is observed:
2If the app’s developer obfuscates the ID through, e.g., mathematical manipulation, our reaching-definition analysis
will not be able to return concrete values for the view ID. In this case Argus-SAF will conservatively report a possible
malicious app, since it is extremely unlikely a benign app will perform such manipulations on a view ID.
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1) the password is logged in clear text (Case 1 in Table 7.3);
2) the password is reaching a Network API over HTTP channel (Entry 2 in Table 7.3);
3) the password is saved in SharedPreference (Entry 3 in Table 7.3).
Case 2 stems from a third-party library for Twitter. The DDG and DFG shows that the app sends
the user’s password to http://api.twitter.com/1 (an HTTP connection). Interestingly, one can see
that the URL is not currently working and only responds with a message “SSL is required.”
Table 7.3: Password leakage checker report
App Name Dataset Description
com.datpiff.mobile.apk GPlay Get user password, encode it, then write it into log.
com.toystorymusic.musicapp.* MAL Send password to server via http.
com.snappii.angel investin-
g news v10.apk
GPlay Write user password into SharedPreference.
7.4.2 OAuth Token Leakage Checker
OAuth 2.0 [81] is a popular authentication protocol which is frequently used for single-sign-on
(SSO), social sharing, etc. Typically, Google, Facebook, and other popular services are the Identity
Provider (IdP). Thus, if the OAuth token is stolen, the user’s corresponding IdP account can be
compromised. Similar to password tracking, Argus-SAF can be used to check whether the input
app obeys the OAuth token protection policy. The source of the potential leak is determined using a
simple strategy of tracking the string literal “access-token” and marking the related object creation
statements as the source. The sinks are the same as in the password leak detection. Argus-SAF
found several potential OAuth token leakage cases, some of which are shown in Table 7.4. A couple
of interesting patterns is observed:
1) The implicit intent carrying the token can possibly reach a malicious app. (e.g., Case 1 in
Table 7.4), and
2) A malicious app having Log-read permission can grab the OAuth token (e.g., Case 1 and
Case 2 in Table 7.4).
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Note that the above type of token leakage is very different from the explicit token discoveries
reported in a recent work [82].
Table 7.4: OAuth token leakage checker report
App Name Dataset Description
com.skout.android.apk GPlay Send OAuth token via implicit ICC; also write it
to Log.i().
com.keek.apk GPlay Write OAuth token into log using Log.d().
7.4.3 Hiding-icon Checker
ComponentName v0_3 = this.getComponentName();
Context v1_1 = this.getApplicationContext();
PackageManager v1_2 = v1_1.getPackageManager();
v1_2.setComponentEnabledSetting(v0_3,
PackageManager.COMPONENT_ENABLED_STATE_DISABLED,
PackageManager.DONT_KILL_APP);
J1.
J2.
J3.
J4.
Figure 7.4: Hiding-icon code snippet
Hiding-icon is one common malware scheme to hide the application’s physical existence on
the phone. In particular, it hides the malware app’s launcher icon while making the malware’s back-
ground service run. To do this, the app needs to disable its main component while telling the android
system not to kill its background service by calling an API Context.setComponentEnabledSetting()
with specific parameters as shown in Figure 7.4.
The idea of detecting such suspicious behavior is to extract from DFG the values passed to
the Context.setComponentEnabledSetting() API and match them with the malformed parameters
(as shown in Figure 7.4). Applying this checker to the app dataset, Argus-SAF found 4 GPlay apps
and 75 MAL apps having this suspicious behavior.
7.4.4 Crypto Library Misconfiguration Checker
The author implemented a plugin to check whether an app conforms to the following crypto
API configuration rules [28]:
1) Do not use ECB mode for encryption.
2) Do not use a non-random IV for CBC encryption.
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Rule 1 is to evaluate the string value used to create the javax.crypto.Cipher instance. If the string
value indicates that the cipher will run in ECB mode, the checker will report an alarm. To check
Rule 2 , the checker first detects the cipher is using the CBC mode, and then checks the IV creation
process to see whether a constant IV is used. Table 7.5 summarizes the results Argus-SAF obtained
through running the above checker on the app dataset.
Table 7.5: Crypto library misconfiguration checker report
Dataset GPlay MAL
#apps using ECB mode 438 303
#apps using non-random IV 210 87
7.4.5 SSL/TLS Misconfiguration Checker
SSL/TLS protocols are widely adopted in Android applications to provide secure data trans-
mission between the client app and their backend server. App developers may not be adequately
trained for correctly using SSL/TLS library, and there is a lack of visual security indicators for
SSL/TLS usage in the development environment (IDE). As a result, SSL/TLS library APIs can be
easily misconfigured [22,29].
One common misuse case is allowing all hostnames for the SSL/TLS’s HostnameVerifier, by
invoking SSLSocketFactory.setHostnameVerifier() with parameter ALLOW ALL HOSTNAME
VERIFIER. To capture this, the checker will evaluate whether the parameter passed to SSLSocket-
Factory.setHostnameVerifier() is equal to ALLOW ALL HOSTNAME VERIFIER.
Another misuse case is accepting all certificates or accepting all hostnames for a certificate
as long as a trusted CA signed the certificate, by providing their own or third-party-implemented
TrustManager and SocketFactory. [29] provides a list of problematic TrustManager and SocketF-
actory implementations with its class names, which our checker plugin searches for in a given app.
Table 7.6 summarizes the results Argus-SAF obtained through running the above checker on the
app dataset.
7.4.6 Communication Data Leakage Checker
Phone call logs, contacts, and SMS messages are a few examples of user’s sensitive infor-
mation which should be kept private. Argus-SAF can be used to check whether an app obeys
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Table 7.6: SSL/TLS misconfiguration checker report
Dataset GPlay MAL
# apps with Bad TrustManager 63 18
# apps with Bad SSLSocketFactory 37 13
# apps with Bad SSL hostname configuration 288 192
the above data usage policy. Argus-SAF applies simple strategies to identify the various com-
munication data sources. Basically, Argus-SAF tracks the corresponding (i.e., tied with the data
source) string literals or BroadcastReceivers: (1) Call logs: “content://call log/calls”; (2) Sim
card contacts: “content://icc/adn”; (3) Phone contacts: “com.android.contacts”; (4) SMS: “con-
tent://sms/inbox/” and input for BroadcastReceivers handling the “SMS RECEIVED” event.
On the other hand, the sinks are any outgoing communication channel, such as http/https
write, SMS send, implicit Intent send, etc. Argus-SAF found several potential sensitive data leakage
cases, some of which are shown in Table 7.7.
Table 7.7: Communication data leakage checker report
App Name Dataset Description
com.skymoons.hqg.anzhi.apk GPlay Read user’s SMS inbox, write into log, then send
text message to the senders.
12050f267d5e8ce6f77d2111cd-
3043f0.apk
MAL Read user’s SMS inbox, store in a JSON object,
write into SharedPrefeferences, then upload to its
C&C server.
5339a0e7e86ac1f5472f832874-
426c25.apk
MAL Upload user’s SMS content and information to its
C&C server.
51bf3112982473e99b88965f6e-
271799.apk
MAL Read user’s SMS inbox, upload to its C&C server,
send text message to senders.
7.4.7 Intent Injection Checker
Intent is one of the most common ways for an Android component to receive and process data
from outside. If an app makes wrong assumptions for the incoming intent and performs sensitive
operations based on it, that may result in serious security holes [3, 4].
To detect the above issue, Argus-SAF mark the intent receiving point as the source and
sensitive operations (such as open URL connection, crafting another intent) as the sink. Argus-SAF
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then queries the DDG to find whether there is a data dependence path between them. Argus-SAF
found several potential intent injection cases, some of which are shown in Table 7.8.
Table 7.8: Intent injection checker report
App Name Dataset Description
com.fcbh.dbp.BibleSocietyO-
fPhilippines.apk
GPlay TwitterLoginActivity retrieves the “url” from in-
coming intent and sends it to another Activity.
com.kamagames.notepad.apk GPlay Start an activity by using the mData of the incom-
ing intent.
com.qryptal.verifydetailsaut-
henticate.android.apk
GPlay Allows any app inject URL to its ShareActivity,
which will then encode it to a Barcode and display
to the user. If user scan the Barcode, they might
be redirected to malicious websites.
com.freegame.basketball.apk GPlay Allows any app inject data into its SharedRefer-
ence, which will disable this app’s functionality.
com.mmmono.mono.apk GPlay Allows any app send commands to start/stop its
service’s heartbeat and connectivity status.
com.bigfishgames.dmddgoog-
free.apk
GPlay Allows any app send commands to launch arbitrary
URL and components.
7.4.8 Inter-language Security Checker
The author evaluated Argus-SAF for real-world app security vetting on our datasets and
successfully detected four kinds of security issues in real-world apps that hide malicious behavior
into the native world to evade the detection of static analysis tools that only cover the java world.
7.4.8.1 Case Study 1: Inter-language Data Leakage
Sensitive information leakage has been a widespread security issue in Android platform. To
make detection harder, malware moves the leaky behavior into the native world. For example,
Backdoor.Triada.1 (Version 1 of backdoor malware Triada) [9] obtains the IMSI of the device in
java layer. Then it passes the IMSI to native method nativeSayTest(). The corresponding native
function will then leak IMSI by invoking SmsManager.sendTextMessage().
Argus-SAF can detect this issue because Native Function Summary Builder will generate a
summary ∆(nativeSayTest) = 〈(sink(arg2)@Cx)〉 and feed back to SBDA. SBDA will then mark
the IMSI as the source, and when nativeSayTest() is invoked with such source, Argus-SAF will
report the leak issue.
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7.4.8.2 Case Study 2: Stealthy Command Execution
Malware writers love to use shell command to execute malicious behaviors. For example,
Backdoor.DroidKungFu.1 is a backdoor malware that tries to root the device and execute malicious
code. It roots the device with the aid of the secbino program. If the device has not been rooted,
it will copy secbino to /data/data/pkg/secbino and chmod 4755 to get the execution permission.
Then it executes secbino to get the root privilege and start a service to download other malware
apks to install.
Argus-SAF can detect these behaviors by modeling those Linux programs that can execute
the shell command, such as, popen, system, execv. Argus-SAF can get the parameters of those
system API and know what shell commands are executed.
7.4.8.3 Case Study 3: Stealthy Command and Control Communication
Command and Control (C&C) server is frequently used in malware to conceal the malware
command and control information generation process into network communication. This process
can also move to native world. For example, Trojan-Dropper.Boqx.1 launches a thread to exec
native code in StatService class. In the native world, it enables the WIFI to ensure the success of
communicating with a server. Then it communicates with the server to get the malicious payload
and then dynamically loads these payloads. All these behaviors are completed by native reflection
calls.
Argus-SAF can detect such malicious behavior because of Argus-SAF models all the JNI
functions from the JNINativeInterface structure. After running ADA, Argus-SAF can know what
kind of reflection calls are made in the native world.
7.4.8.4 Case Study 4: Malicious Identity Hiding
Malicious identity such as server URL and premium number is essential for many malware
analysis techniques. There exist malware samples that hide those identities in the native world. For
example, Trojan-SMS.Ogel.1 encapsulates its C&C server URL in native code, and when it starts
running, it will read the URL data by invoking a native function Java com googlle cn ni u().
Java com googlle cn ni u() uses NewStringUTF() to create a java String of its URL.
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Argus-SAF can obtain the value of the C&C server URL. When malware returns the server
URL from native world to java world through native method, NativeDroid can generate the sum-
mary that illustrates this process ∆(u) = 〈(ret = URL@Cx)(source(URL)@Cx)〉. Then Amandroid
will continue SBDA with the summary information.
7.5 What it Takes to Build a New Analysis
The advantage of Argus-SAF’s approach is that the general framework provides a means
for building a variety of further security analyses in a straightforward and easy way. Each special
analysis built on top of Argus-SAF involves developing a “Checker plugin” that leverages the DFGs
and DDGs from Argus-SAF’s analysis. Moreover, once the core analysis produces DFGs and DDGs
for an app, they can be stored and reused in multiple security analyses. Table 7.9 presents the
summary of the plugins used in the above applications, which shows their size in Scala LOC, as
well as the average running time. This can be compared with the size of the core engine and its
average running time, shown in the last row of the table.
Table 7.9: Code size and running time (checkers and core)
Name
Approx. Size
Avg. Time
(Scala LOC)
Password Leakage Checker 120 50ms
OAuth Token Leakage Checker 120 50ms
Hiding-Icon Checker 40 50ms
Crypto Library Misconfiguration Checker 109 50ms
SSL/TLS Misconfiguration Checker 62 20ms
Data Leakage Checker 73 50ms
Intent Injection Checker 23 100ms
Core Framework 46,345 440s
7.6 Comparison with Existing Tools
This dissertation uses three benchmarks, DroidBench, ICC-Bench and NativeFlowBench to
compare Argus-SAF with most well-known static analysis tools for Android: FlowDroid [19], Ic-
cTA [26], and DroidSafe [25]. The benchmark test suites consist of hand-crafted apps designed to
test specific analysis features. Since those apps are hand-crafted, the ground truth is known, which
allows us to compute metrics such as precision and recall. However, one needs to keep in mind that
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these metrics are not representative of the performance of the tools on real-world apps. They can
only be used for comparison purposes.
DroidBench [83] is a benchmark test suite published by the FlowDroid team, which consists of
Android apps for evaluating information-flow analysis. The version this dissertation used contains
21 apps, including inter-component communication challenges as well as inter-app communication
challenges. ICC-Bench [84] contains 24 apps for testing various Intent communication, RPC com-
munication, static fields tracking capabilities as well as multi-app analysis capabilities. The test
apps in ICC-Bench are categorized into four parts each of which focuses on one type of ICC: Part
A involves various types of intent handling: explicit intent target finding, implicit intent target
finding (via matching action, categories, data, and type), and dynamically registered component
handling, etc.; Part B focuses on the accuracy of the analysis by including a variety of scenarios
where certain Intent-related information flow paths do or do not exist, and the capability to handle
IntentService3 and Stateful ICC; Part C tests the ability of handling different types of RPC commu-
nications; Part D contains one comprehensive test case to test whether the tool can handle complex
scenarios where data may flow via various communication channels. ICC-Bench is designed by us
and publicly available [84]. The apps in these test suites are not crafted to favor a particular tool.
They represent common scenarios one will find when reasoning about the relevant security issues.
The author run each tool on each test app to check if the tool can report the correct data leak
paths. The detailed comparison of the performance of FlowDroid/IccTA, DroidSafe and Argus-
SAF on DroidBench and ICC-Bench is available in Table 7.10 and Table 7.11, respectively. The
results are shown regarding True Positive (O), False Positive (*), and False Negative (X), if any. If
a test app contains multiple data leak paths, the result is shown for each of them. As an example,
in Table 7.10 for the ActivityCommunication2 app of DroidBench, both IccTA and Argus-SAF
have an entry “OO*,” which indicate that these tools detect two paths (i.e., OO) but also report
one false path (i.e., *). The author observes that Argus-SAF outperforms IccTA and DroidSafe
on both benchmarks. The sole false negative of Argus-SAF for DroidBench is due to Argus-SAF
3IntentService is a special Service, which receives an Intent and executes the corresponding operation in back-
ground.
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Table 7.10: Results on DroidBench
App Name Argus-SAF
FlowDroid
DroidSafe
IccTA
Inter-component Communication (ICC)
ActivityCommunication1 O O O
ActivityCommunication2 OO* OO* OO
ActivityCommunication3 O X O
ActivityCommunication4 OO OO* OO
ActivityCommunication5 O O O
ActivityCommunication6 O X O
ActivityCommunication7 O O O
ActivityCommunication8 OO OO* OO
BroadcastTaintAndLeak1 OO OO OX
ComponentNotInManifest1
EventOrdering1 O O O
IntentSink1 O O O
IntentSink2 O O O**
IntentSource1 O O O
ServiceCommunication1 O X O**
SharedPreferences1 O O O
Singletons1 X X O
UnresolvableIntent1 OOO OOO OOO
Sum, Precision and Recall — ICC
O, higher is better 22 19 22
*, lower is better 1 3 4
X, lower is better 1 4 1
Precision p = O/(O + *) 96% 86% 85%
Recall r = O/(O + X) 96% 83% 96%
F-measure 2pr/(p + r) 96% 85% 90%
Inter-app Communication (IAC)
Echoer
O14*5 N/A N/ASendSMS
StartActivityForResult1
Precision and Recall — IAC
Precision p = O/(O + *) 74%
Recall r = O/(O + X) 100%
F-measure 2pr/(p + r) 85%
O = True Positive, * = False Positive, X = False Negative.
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Table 7.11: Results on ICC-Bench
App Name Argus-SAF
FlowDroid
DroidSafe
IccTA
Part A — Intent Addressing
Intent Explicit1 O O X
Intent Implicit Action OO OO XX
Intent Implicit Category OO OO XX
Intent Implicit Data1 OO OO XX
Intent Implicit Data2 OO OO XX
Intent Implicit Mix1 OOO OOO XXX
Intent Implicit Mix2 OO OO XX
Intent DynRegisteredReceiver1 OO OO XX
Intent DynRegisteredReceiver2 OO* OO* XX
Part B — Intent Data Flow Tracking
Intent Explicit NoSrc NoSink
Intent Explicit NoSrc Sink
Intent Explicit Src NoSink
Intent Explicit Src Sink O O X
Intent Implicit NoSrc NoSink
Intent Implicit NoSrc Sink
Intent Implicit Src NoSink O O X
Intent Implicit Src Sink OO OO XX
InteneIntentService O O X
Intent Stateful OOO OOO OXX
Part C — RPC
RPC LocalService O O X
RPC MessengerService O X X
RPC AIDL O X X***
RPC ReturnSensitive O O X
Part D — Mixed
Intent RPC Comprehensive O X X******
Sum, Precision and Recall — ICC-Bench
O, higher is better 31 28 1
*, lower is better 1 1 9
X, lower is better 0 3 30
Precision p = O/(O + *) 97% 97% 10%
Recall r = O/(O + X) 100% 90% 3%
F-measure 2pr/(p + r) 98% 93% 5%
O = True Positive, * = False Positive, X = False Negative.
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not modeling Java Singleton. The false positives of Argus-SAF on both benchmarks are due to
context-insensitive inter-component data flow handling and the rudimentary string analysis.
Although IccTA’s website claims that the tool is capable of performing inter-app analysis by
combining multiple apks into a single apk, in our experience their ApkCombiner failed to combine
the inter-app communication apps in DroidBench. Thus the author could not obtain any result
from IccTA on the inter-app communication experiment for DroidBench. Moreover, the ICC-Bench
apps have all been updated to the newest Android version (Android 7.1.1), representing the current
Android application design with the new permission acquiring mechanism introduced by Android
M and later versions. Neither IccTA nor Argus-SAF had the problem of detecting data leaks in
the new version of apps after the author manually updated some of their dependency libraries
and Android sdk. However, DroidSafe could not handle the new design even after update the
dependency libraries and Android SDK, and that is the reason DroidSafe is shown to be missing
so many paths over ICC-Bench test suite.
For evaluation purpose, the author designed NativeFlowBench [85] since there is no existing
benchmark for evaluating inter-language data-flow analysis capability of Android static analysis
tools. NativeFlowBench contains a set of hand-crafted apps designed to test specific analysis
features. Since those apps are hand-crafted, the ground truth is known, and metrics like precision
and recall can be computed. NativeFlowBench contains 22 apps categorized in three parts: Part
A focuses on inter-language dataflow analysis challenges: native source and sink finding, native
method to native function resolving, JNI library function modeling, native dataflow analysis with
Java objects, etc. Part B focuses on the native Activity resolving. Part C focuses on inter-
component communication between Java and native components. The apps in these test suites are
not crafted to favor a particular tool. They present common scenarios one will find when reasoning
about the relevant security issues.
The effectiveness comparison of Argus-SAF with all other major Android static analysis tools:
FlowDroid [19], IccTA [26], DroidSafe [25]. the author run each tool against each of the benchmark
apps to check if the tool can report the correct data leak paths, and the detailed comparison is
reported in Table 7.12. The results are shown regarding True Positive (O), False Positive (*) and
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Table 7.12: Results on NativeFlowBench
App Name Argus-SAF
FlowDroid
DroidSafe
IccTA
Part A: Inter-language Dataflow
native source O X X
native nosource
native source clean *
native leak O X X
native leak dynamic register O X X
native dynamic register multiple O X X
native noleak
native noleak array *
native method overloading
native multiple interactions O X X
native multiple libraries O X X
native complexdata O X X
native complexdata stringop *
native heap modify O X X
native set field from native OO XX XX
native set field from arg OO XX XX
native set field from arg field OO XX XX
Part B: Native Activity Resolve
native pure O X X
native pure direct O X X
native pure direct customized O X X
Part C: Inter-component Communication
icc javatonative O X X
icc nativetojava O X X
Sum, Precision and Recall
O, higher is better 19 0 0
*, lower is better 2 1 0
X, lower is better 0 19 19
Precision p = O/(O + *) 90.5% 0.0% N/A
Recall r = O/(O + X) 100% 0.0% 0.0%
F-measure 2pr/(p + r) 95.0% N/A N/A
O = True Positive, * = False Positive, X = False Negative.
IccTA is applied for handle part C: Inter-component Communication.
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False Negative (X), if any. If an app has more than one leakage path, then the result is shown
for each of them. Not surprisingly, Argus-SAF outperforms all other tools as none of the existing
Android static analysis tools have inter-language analysis capability. DroidSafe is outdated and
failed to analyze any of the benchmark apps. Amandroid and FlowDroid both identified one false
path at native source clean. This is caused by their conservative model for native method calls – if
one of the argument is tainted all other arguments will also be considered as tainted. IccTA failed to
handle the inter-component communication cases due to the lack of native code resolution. Argus-
SAF has false alarm on native noleak array because Argus-SAF cannot distinguish different index
of a java array. Argus-SAF has false alarm on native complexdata stringop because Argus-SAF
does not do precise string analysis.
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CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSIONS
This dissertation proposes a static analysis approach to assist security vetting of Android
applications. Compare to all other related approaches, the approach proposed in this thesis has
the advantage of comprehensive coverage of Android-specific behaviors, modularity, and efficiency.
Comprehensive Android behavior coverage brings precision, crucial for a useable static vetting
system. Modularity makes the static analysis framework more flexible and easy to be extended and
customized to address emerging security issues. Efficiency is essential for practical use.
This dissertation made available a comprehensive model of handle Android component-based
nature as discussed in Chapter 4 and proposed a new algorithm to address Android application
NDK/JNI-awareness in Chapter 5. Those approaches form a comprehensive
This dissertation describes a static analysis framework, Argus-SAF, that precisely track the
control and data-flow in an inter-component, inter-language and NDK/JNI-aware fashion, and can
compute an abstraction of the app’s behavior in the forms of data-flow graph (DFG) and data
dependence graph (DDG). As a general framework, Argus-SAF can be easily extended to achieve
a large variety of specialized security analyses. The experiment results showed that Argus-SAF
scales well.
This dissertation presented various security analysis checkers implemented on top of Argus-
SAF. Compare with the Argus-SAF core framework they have an ignorable footprint. Their de-
tection result indicates the Argus-SAF can be effectively applied to the real-world security vetting
scenario. However, the currently available checkers are not rich enough to cover a broad range of
Android security issues. Therefore, it remains future work to extensively implement new security
analysis plugins for Argus-SAF to provide better security issue coverage.
There are several limitations for Argus-SAF that might cause imprecisions in its analysis,
such as, preliminary string analysis, conservative treatment for unmodeled APIs and unhandled
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language features. More work is needed in the future to further improve the effectiveness and
precision of Argus-SAF.
Static analysis is one of the fundamental steps towards complete automation of Android
application security vetting. Once the static features are generated, the next question to ask is
whether the given application is truly malicious or vulnerable. The precise, general and efficient
static analysis engine in Argus-SAF provides a promising outlook to generate rich application
behavior of security vetting system.
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